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ABSTRACT—The litigation campaign that led to McCleskey v. Kemp did
not begin as an anti-death-penalty effort. It grew in soil long washed in the
blood of African-Americans, lynched or executed following rude
semblances of trials and hasty appeals, which had prompted the NAACP
from its very founding to demand “simple justice” in individual criminal
cases. When the Warren Court signaled, in the early 1960s, that it might be
open to reflection on broader patterns of racial discrimination in capital
sentencing, the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF)
began to gather empirical evidence and craft appropriate constitutional
responses. As that effort built, other deficiencies in state capital states
became apparent, and LDF eventually asserted a broader constitutional
critique of state capital structures and processes. By 1967, LDF and its
allies had developed a nationwide “moratorium” campaign that challenged
death sentencing statutes in virtually every state.
Though the campaign appeared poised for partial success in 1969,
changes in Court personnel and shifts in the nation’s mood dashed LDF’s
initial hopes. Yet unexpectedly, in 1972, five Justices ruled in Furman v.
Georgia that all death sentences and all capital statutes nationwide would
fall under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments. Each of the nine Furman Justices wrote separately, without a
single governing rationale beyond their expressed uneasiness that the death
penalty was being imposed infrequently, capriciously, and in an arbitrary
manner. Thirty-five states promptly enacted new and revised capital
statutes. Four years later, a majority of the Court held that three of those
new state statutes met Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment standards. The
1976 Court majority expressed confidence that the states’ newly revised
procedures should work to curb the arbitrariness and capriciousness that
had earlier troubled the Furman majority.
The McCleskey case emerged from subsequent review of post-Furman
sentencing patterns in the State of Georgia. A brilliant and exhaustive study
by Professor David Baldus and his colleagues demonstrated that the Court’s
assumptions in 1976 were wrong; strong racial disparities in capital
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sentencing continued to persist statewide in Georgia—especially in cases in
which the victims of homicide were white. The Supreme Court eventually
heard and decided this case, ruling five to four against Warren
McCleskey’s claims in 1987. Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion purported to
accept in theory, but appears grievously to have misunderstood or
disregarded in fact, McCleskey’s powerful and unrebutted evidence of
racial discrimination. Justice Powell’s decision likewise appears to have
contorted the Court’s prior Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, erecting all-but-insuperable future barriers against statistical
proof of racial discrimination anywhere within the criminal justice system.
This Symposium reflects on the handiwork of the Court in McCleskey
and its subsequent impact. As one member of the legal team who brought
the case, my contribution is to speculate on how and why the Court might
have acquiesced in the face of such troubling patterns in capital sentencing,
despite the Justices’ clear condemnation of racial discrimination in
principle and their occasional intervention to curb particularly egregious
acts of racial injustice. This Essay ends by encouraging social scientists and
legal scholars to continue to uncover and oppose patterns of racial
discrimination that remain widespread in the administration of criminal
justice.
AUTHOR—Wade Edwards Distinguished Professor of Law, Emeritus,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. My thanks to Professor
Destiny Peery and student members of the Northwestern University Law
Review for conceiving and hosting this outstanding Symposium, “‘A Fear
of Too Much Justice’? Equal Protection and the Social Sciences 30 Years
After McCleskey v. Kemp,” and for expanding their invitation beyond the
roster of distinguished empiricists and legal scholars to include a
practitioner-relic from an earlier time. I am also grateful to my life partner,
Jennifer Boger, for many suggestions and edits to this Essay, and for her
perpetual good cheer and support during my years of capital defense
litigation.
In the 1980s, I was part of a legal team that represented Warren
McCleskey, a death-sentenced inmate forever linked with the Supreme
Court decision that is the object of this thirtieth anniversary Symposium.
Warren was an African-American, born into poverty and family
dysfunction in Marietta, Georgia.1 He was convicted and sentenced to death
1
JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN
DEATH PENALTY 11–13 (2015). McCleskey never knew his natural father. His mother Willie Mae
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in Fulton County, Georgia, in 1978 for the murder of an Atlanta police
officer, Frank Schlatt, during an armed robbery of the Dixie Furniture
Store.2 Warren was ultimately executed in Georgia’s electric chair on
September 25, 1991.3
Although the McCleskey case occupied much of my professional life
for over a decade, my reflections—on the Court’s treatment of David
Baldus’s sophisticated empirical evidence, Justice Lewis Powell’s muchcriticized constitutional rationales, the decision’s subsequent reach—
inevitably begin with historical forces at work long before April 22, 1987
when McCleskey v. Kemp was announced. Professor Reva Siegel sounds an
historical theme in her opening Essay.4 I am drawn to conclude in a related
vein.
For McCleskey certainly did not begin with me, nor with Warren
McCleskey, nor with the Baldus study, nor with the Rehnquist Court’s
1985 Term. It began, in my view, no later than the dawn of the twentieth
century, when the NAACP, formed in 1909 under the leadership of W.E.B.
Du Bois and his colleagues, committed its energies to organize, to lobby,
and, eventually, to move into state and federal courts to combat the
relentless regime of racial subordination and oppression that was Jim
Crow.5
While the principal legal objectives of the NAACP and its legal arm,
which eventually incorporated separately as the NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF), were to enlarge and expand affirmative
rights for law-abiding African-American people—voting, equal educational
opportunities, workplace fairness, and residential opportunities6—the
McCleskey raised six children in the “Skid Row” section of Marietta, where violence and random death
were a daily threat. For a time, he was placed with an aunt who often beat him. When Warren was eight
years old, his mother married a physically abusive man, John Henry Brooks, who drank and often beat
his wife and stepchildren. The family ran an illegal gambling casino in their ramshackle home, where
Warren and his brothers and sisters were obliged to serve alcohol to the rowdy patrons. Id.
2
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283, 285 (1987); see also KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 15–
17.
3
Peter Applebome, Georgia Inmate is Executed After ‘Chaotic’ Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26,
1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/26/us/georgia-inmate-is-executed-after-chaotic-legalmove.html [https://perma.cc/ZMX4-GKA9].
4
Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Supreme Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of
Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey—And Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1269
(2018).
5
See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 96–101 (2004); DAVID LEVERING
LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE, 1869–1919, at 386–407 (1993); PATRICIA SULLIVAN,
LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1–16 (2009).
6
The NAACP “pledged itself to work for the abolition of all forced segregation, equal education
for Negro and white children, the complete enfranchisement of the Negro, and the enforcement of the
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organization repeatedly found itself compelled to deploy its scarce
resources defensively as well, to protect men and women of color suspected
of crimes against blatant acts by white prosecutors and judges, and often by
white mobs,7 who bypassed or shortcut or distorted ordinary criminal
processes to deny “simple justice” to African-American communities.8
NAACP lawyers were especially drawn into Southern courtrooms to
defend capitally charged black men in egregious cases that did reach state
courts for trial—Moore v. Dempsey9 and Powell v. Alabama,10 among a
score of others—contesting such travesties as police interrogation
conducted from the barrel of a shotgun or a noose around the suspect’s
neck, or jury selection processes in which all the black names mysteriously
disappeared from jury lists.11 The LDF’s celebrated team of mid-twentiethcentury legal counsel—Thurgood Marshall, Constance Baker Motley,
Robert Carter, and Jack Greenberg—each did service in hostile Southern
courthouses where their clients’ lives, and their own safety as counsel,
hung precariously in balance.12
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.” JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES 439 (1947).
7
John Hope Franklin reported that “[i]n the last sixteen years of the nineteenth century there had
been more than 2,500 lynchings, the great majority of which were of Negroes.” Id. at 431. While there
was some hope that the new twentieth century might bring a change, instead, the years from 1900 until
the beginning of World War I witnessed more than 1,100 additional lynchings. Id. at 432. In response,
the NAACP joined with those like Ida B. Wells-Barnett to lobby Congress for federal anti-lynching
statutes, a campaign repeatedly thwarted by the power of Southern members of the United States
Senate. See, e.g., KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 119–29; SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 105–10, 194–97;
Thomas C. Holt, The Lonely Warrior: Ida B. Wells-Barnett and the Struggle for Black Leadership, in
BLACK LEADERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 39, 42–43, 53–54, 59–60 (John Hope Franklin &
August Meier eds., 1982).
8
FRANKLIN, supra note 6, at 439–40, 478–79; KLUGER, supra note 5, at 100–01; SULLIVAN, supra
note 5, at 18–19.
9
261 U.S. 86 (1923).
10
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11
KLUGER, supra note 5, at 112–15 (describing the background facts and trial of Moore v.
Dempsey, a case where black defendants argued that their due process rights were infringed by an allwhite jury pressured by roving white mob members). See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A
TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 2007) (recounting the role of the NAACP in the
protracted and contentious, off-and-on representation of the nine defendants in the Scottsboro cases);
see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281–82 (1936) (recounting how black defendants’
confessions were obtained after they had been repeatedly whipped, beaten, and one, hung from a tree by
a rope); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 312–16 (1997) (recounting the cases of the
“Martinsville Seven,” black defendants all death-sentenced for the alleged rape of a white woman, in
which black lawyers unsuccessfully pressed claims of a pattern of racial discrimination, with the LDF
offering legal assistance on appeal).
12
See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 50–66 (1994); GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD
MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA (2012) (recounting the cases
of four black men in a Florida community falsely accused of rape who were successfully defended by
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There came a time when a more comprehensive opportunity to
redress these criminal justice grievances presented itself. The moment was
June of 1963. Nine years earlier, in 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren had
announced Brown v. Board of Education, marking a profound break with
eighty years of judicial betrayal of protections promised under the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.13 By the early 1960s,
the Warren Court had also undertaken a “criminal law revolution,”
extending one by one, to state criminal defendants, most of the Bill of
Rights protections originally applicable only against federal actors.14
It was during this springtime for civil rights and civil liberties claims
that a newly appointed Justice, Arthur Goldberg, and his young law clerk,
Alan Dershowitz, came forward in 1963 with an internal memorandum,
circulated to other Justices, proposing that the Court should take up the
question “[w]hether, and under what circumstances, the imposition of the
death penalty is proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.”15 After cataloguing arguments as to why all
capital punishment might violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, Goldberg’s memo focused on its use against those convicted of
“sexual crimes which do not endanger life (e.g., rape),”16 noting “the wellrecognized disparity in the imposition of the death penalty for sexual
crimes committed by whites and nonwhites,” and citing statistics
illustrating that between 1937 and 1951, 233 of the 259 defendants
executed for rape in the United States were African-American.17 He urged
the Court to order briefing and argument on all these issues.18
Goldberg found, to his dismay, that a majority of the Justices were not
eager to expand their docket to embrace this new cause. Indeed, Chief
Justice Warren, Brown’s author, cautioned Goldberg prudentially that if he
Marshall and Jack Greenberg despite rampant injustice, Ku Klux Klan violence, and personal danger to
counsel); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 93–102 (1994) (same); id. at 256–59 (recounting
unsuccessful last-minute attempts to save a black defendant from electrocution in Georgia, despite
powerful evidence that he could not have committed the crime).
13
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A
CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY xii–xviii (2001); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 139–47 (3d ed. 1974).
14
See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective,
31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 249 (1968).
15
Arthur J. Goldberg, Memorandum to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment, October Term,
1963, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 493 (1986); see also KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 76–78.
16
Goldberg, supra note 15, at 504.
17
Id. at 505 n.18.
18
Id. at 493, 499; see also MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 28–30 (1973).
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did press the death penalty issue further, he should omit the issue of racial
injustice.19 This theme of “racial avoidance” by the Court is one we shall
see again.20
Only partially deterred, Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices William
O. Douglas and William Brennan, published a rare dissent in June of 1963
from the Court’s decision to deny certiorari in a “routine” rape case,
Rudolph v. Alabama.21 Justice Goldberg’s dissent posed the questions
whether, in light of the international and American trend against the
imposition of death for rape, Arkansas’s continued use of the penalty
violated the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards of decency.”22 It
read like an engraved invitation to resourceful counsel to build a trial
record against rape as punishment and return to the Court, where the three
dissenting Justices had already signaled their predisposition to entertain the
claims favorably.23
Nowhere was this invitation weighed more seriously than in the
offices of the LDF. Despite a docket already overflowing with cases on
school desegregation, college integration, and civil rights demonstrations,
Jack Greenberg, Thurgood Marshall’s chosen successor as
Director/Counsel of the LDF, charged several LDF staffers, including
Michael Meltsner, Leroy Clark, and Frank Heffron, to begin exploring this

19
EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 27–28 (2013).
20
See id. at 25–28. Mandery notes that Chief Justice Warren was keenly aware of the hostile
political responses to Brown and widespread Southern defiance of its mandate for school integration,
and suggests that Warren thought it would be imprudent for the Court to take on the death penalty,
especially focusing on its racially discriminatory features during that period. “Ruling the death penalty
unconstitutional would mean stepping in on behalf of black rapists and murderers. This would be more
than the public could take.” Id. at 26; see also EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 88 (1998) (citing a
secondhand account by Justice Douglas of Chief Justice Warren’s rationale); David C. Baldus, George
Woodworth & Catherine M. Grosso, Race and Proportionality Since McCleskey v. Kemp (1987):
Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of Denial and Avoidance, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143
(2007) (naming and exploring this “denial and avoidance” strategy by the Supreme Court of the United
States, the United States Congress, and state legislatures and supreme courts); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (2015)
(exploring the repeated occasions on which the Supreme Court has avoided addressing evidence of
racial discrimination).
21
375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas, & Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
22
Id. at 890 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
23
Professor Jeffrey Kirchmeier has observed that “the questions in the dissent sent out a message
to capital defense attorneys across the country that at least some of the justices were open to
constitutional arguments about the death penalty. . . . Justice Goldberg . . . hoped it would inspire
lawyers to concentrate on bringing more challenges to the nation’s death penalty.” KIRCHMEIER, supra
note 1, at 78.
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possible new campaign.24 LDF was initially drawn toward this struggle not
with the aim of abolishing capital punishment for its own sake, but because
of its visibly racial misuse, a pattern Greenberg and LDF knew well.25 The
story of the subsequent LDF-led campaign is a familiar one, oft retold, but I
briefly recount it to underscore certain features that have significance for
what ultimately transpired in McCleskey.
Two crucial personnel decisions helped shape all that followed. The
first was the recruitment into the effort of a young law professor, Anthony
G. Amsterdam, among the very most brilliant, innovative, and selfless legal
academics of the past half-century. Amsterdam, a summa cum laude
graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a rare nonHarvard clerk for Justice Felix Frankfurter in 1962, had already gained near
legendary status for his encyclopedic knowledge of federal law, his
astonishing ability to spin out ingenious legal theories, his twenty-hour
work days, and his unstinting devotion to civil liberties causes.26 Another
Penn recruit was Professor Marvin Wolfgang, one of the most eminent and
seasoned criminologists in the nation, who agreed to carry out an empirical
study to probe the rape claim.27
Together, Wolfgang, Amsterdam, and their LDF colleagues began to
plan what was, for that day, a sophisticated empirical study of the
imposition of capital sentences for the crime of rape. They decided to draw
a scientific sample from the 3,000 capital rape cases that had been
prosecuted in eleven Southern states between 1945 and 1965. They were
keenly aware that simply demonstrating raw disparities between the
number of black and white rape defendants on the one hand, and the
number of black and white death sentences on the other, would not suffice
to sustain a constitutional challenge, since prosecutors would surely
contend that factors other than race itself actually explained the apparent
racial disparities. Wolfgang therefore designed a questionnaire to gather
data on twenty-nine important aspects of each case.28 In the summer of
1965, amid the regional violence and tumult of that bloody civil rights era,
Wolfgang sent forth young data collectors to county courthouses in eleven

24
MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 30–31. See generally GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 440–42;
TUSHNET, supra note 12, at 50–56.
25
MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 35–36.
26
Id. at 79–86; BURTON H. WOLFE, PILEUP ON DEATH ROW 230–32 (1973).
27
Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Racial Discrimination, Rape, and the Death Penalty, in
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 194, 194–97 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982).
28
Id. at 198–200; see also MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 75–78.

1643

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Southern states, charging them to search laboriously, file by file, for the
necessary data on every sampled case.29
Meanwhile, through a gradual process, LDF lawyers arrived at a series
of ethical decisions that would shape the whole future of their
representation in McCleskey and beyond. They could not know, for sure, in
which particular case or cases Wolfgang’s evidence might eventually be
presented. Unlike many civil “test cases,” in which counsel can select
especially sympathetic plaintiffs to present their issues in the most
favorable factual light, criminal cases frequently involve defendants
charged with serious misdeeds who do not arouse sympathy of any kind. In
these defense cases, moreover, trial and appellate courts are often disposed
summarily to deny new constitutional claims and reluctant to entertain
sophisticated social science evidence, especially in post-conviction
proceedings filed long after the original criminal trials are over. In short,
LDF lawyers would be hard-pressed to wait for just the right case in which
to assert their constitutional claims. Instead, LDF eventually concluded that
it needed to share whatever formal allegations of racial discrimination it
could fashion with every single lawyer representing every single AfricanAmerican rape defendant, standing ready to go forward to a hearing
whenever invited to do so by any interested judge. Such were the
circumstances under which Warren McCleskey’s case would eventually
become the vehicle for considering racial discrimination in Georgia’s post1972 capital statutes.30
While racial disparities in capital sentencing were plainly what drew
LDF into the rape-and-death-penalty struggle, moreover, LDF deemed it
professionally unethical not to assert, on behalf of each such client, any
other constitutional claims, whether racially based or not, that might save
his or her life.31 Some fraction of those claims would be individual to each
particular client’s case—how a defendant had been apprehended and
questioned by police, whether evidence had been obtained illegally, or
whether selection of the jury had violated constitutional norms.
Yet by 1965, under Amsterdam’s guidance, LDF had begun to draw
upon and expand ideas for a series of potentially broadly shared claims
29

MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 86–87.
See Eric Muller, The Legal Defense Fund’s Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting
Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 158, 177 (1985) (noting that “[t]he possibility of choosing
an appealing litigant was a luxury which the planners of the capital punishment campaign could not
enjoy,” and describing LDF’s capital clients as among “the most violent, ugly, and hated dropouts from
American society”).
31
GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 442 (“For reasons related to our professional responsibility to our
clients, . . . [w]e found that we couldn’t ethically limit ourselves to claims of racism if defendants had
other good arguments . . . .”).
30
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based on common procedural choices that most states had made about how
to try capital cases. Among the most important were three later known as
the “bifurcation” claim, the “sentencing guidelines” or “guided discretion”
claim, and the “death qualification” claim.
Most states required capital juries to resolve in a single proceeding
both a defendant’s guilt and, if convicted, his or her sentence as well. Yet
under this so-called “single verdict” approach, evidence that might weigh
powerfully against imposition of a death sentence, such as a childhood
marred by abuse and violence, might point toward a defendant’s possible
guilt. The American Law Institute had recommended the reform of this
system in 1959.32 Amsterdam framed that recommendation as a Due
Process Clause challenge, arguing that states should not force defendants
into a Hobson’s choice between presenting evidence that might save their
lives or not presenting it in an effort to minimize the likelihood of their
conviction. Instead, states should be required to structure bifurcated
proceedings. In the first phase, juries would hear evidence and deliberate
on guilt or innocence, with a second, separate sentencing phase to follow
only if the defendant were convicted of capital murder.33
Amsterdam’s examination of sentencing guidelines resulted in a
similar new challenge. In most states, before juries deliberated on a
defendant’s guilt or innocence, trial judges routinely instructed the jurors in
detail on law pertinent to each element of the crime and how they should
weigh available evidence. Yet in marked contrast, judges allowed jurors to
deliberate without any guidance at all on whether to impose a life or death
sentence. This lack of any uniform “guided discretion” on the crucial issue
of punishment, Amsterdam argued, also failed to meet due process
standards.34
The third broad claim looked neither to the structure of the
proceedings nor to the guidance given jurors but to how those jurors were
selected at the outset of the trial. In most states, prosecutors were allowed,
during their pretrial voir dire examination of prospective jurors,
automatically to exclude “for cause” all jurors who expressed any
hesitation to impose a death sentence. Amsterdam posited that the
wholesale removal of such jurors biased the jury’s deliberations at the guilt
phase of the proceedings, by excusing jurors who could fairly decide the
guilt–innocence issue (and who could indeed be shown to be less biased in
favor of the State on various issues),35 and again at the penalty phase, by
32
33
34
35

LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 91.
MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 68–69.
Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 67–68.
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excluding those who might vote for death in an especially egregious case
but whose initial reluctance to do so represented an important part of the
overall “conscience of the community” that should contribute to the jury’s
recommendation on an appropriate sentence.36
Lawyers at LDF agreed that each of these potentially lifesaving claims
belonged in each capital rape case. Yet these claims seemed equally
applicable to defendants at risk of a death sentence for murder, arson, or
other felonies as well. Could LDF refuse to share its new theories with
black clients facing execution for these other capital crimes? Indeed, could
they restrict their potentially lifesaving theories only to African-American
defendants?
LDF’s answer to each of these questions was “no.”37 While LDF’s
initial campaign had not aimed at abolition of death penalty statutes
generally, through a process of ethical and strategic deduction, it eventually
arrived at a principled approach that seemed to point toward the end, or at
least the radical restructuring, of all state capital sentencing regimes.
Moreover, LDF lawyers reasoned that since many of these issues might be
employed by lawyers for white clients, it would be prudent as well as
principled to become involved in all potential cases that might reach the
Supreme Court.38
Some tactical advantages supported such a decision. If LDF did
manage to build a nationwide network of capital defense attorneys to
defend every client under sentence of death, each of whom raised these
new constitutional claims in state and federal post-conviction proceedings,
proffering identical evidence and seeking final resolution by the Supreme
Court, LDF foresaw that a “pileup on death row” might emerge. Such a de
facto “moratorium” could elevate the public visibility of death penalty
issues in every case. It might also put significant pressure on conscientious
36
The challenge to this practice eventually led to the Supreme Court’s important decision in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
37
See Muller, supra note 30, at 167–69 (suggesting that the original LDF race-focused goals of the
campaign expanded as “the force of abolitionist logic . . . pushed the campaign far beyond its original
scope”); see also MANDERY, supra note 19, at 49 (quoting LDF’s deputy director, James Nabrit, III,
who explained that “[o]ur legal arguments created a lifeboat for people. Everybody was in the lifeboat,
so LDF had an obligation to help them all”); MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 108 (quoting Amsterdam,
who remarked that “[w]e could no more let men die that we had the power to save than we could have
passed by a dying accident victim sprawled bloody and writhing on the road without stopping to render
such aid as we could”).
38
GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 443 (observing that “[t]hese arguments against capital
punishment could be made in the cases of whites as well as blacks. We knew that if we wanted to
persuade the Supreme Court to make law, we needed to control every case possible . . . or some
lawyer . . . who was perhaps not very competent might produce decisions that would tie our hands”);
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 96.
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judges, forcing them to decide claims in the awareness that their decisions
might affect the fates of not one or two defendants, but many hundreds.39
Yet this commitment to share potentially lifesaving constitutional
claims with all capital inmates obviously came at a price. It took away key
tools that experienced civil law reformers often employ to their advantage:
to select a case with sympathetic clients and “favorable facts” and to file
the case if possible before a favorably disposed judge. By contrast, LDF’s
capital campaign would cede to any willing state or federal judge the
opportunity to weigh complex empirical evidence and assess novel
constitutional claims on behalf of any inmate who had pled LDF’s claims.
In 1967, Amsterdam and LDF lawyers embarked on this never-beforeattempted effort to provide post-conviction assistance to every capital
defendant, prompted in part by an announcement of Florida’s new
governor, Claude Kirk, Jr., that he intended to begin executions for all of
Florida’s nineteen inmates within a few weeks.40 Amsterdam, LDF staffer
Jack Himmelstein, and others worked with legal allies in Florida and then
California to obtain stays of execution in all pending capital cases.41 To do
so, they prepared and circulated widely a “last aid” kit of papers: model
constitutional claims and motions that would offer to provide evidence in
support of each claim, ideally to be placed in the cases of every capitally
sentenced defendant in America.42 LDF also held regional and statewide
conferences to instruct willing volunteer attorneys in how to present such
claims, and LDF agreed to stand, like a guarantor on a bank loan, as a
backup source of help and counsel for any attorney called into court for a
full post-conviction hearing on any of the claims. In effect, LDF’s original
objective to challenge the racially disproportionate death sentencing of
African-Americans for the crime of interracial rape became a nationwide
campaign directed at the modern death penalty itself.43
39
MANDERY, supra note 19, at 65; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 106–07; WOLFE, supra note 26, at
244–45.
40
WOLFE, supra note 26, at 230–38.
41
GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 443–46; WOLFE, supra note 26, at 229–43.
42
MANDERY, supra note 19, at 52; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 107–10; WOLFE, supra note 26, at
244–46.
43
MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 112–15. LDF was joined in this campaign at the national level by
the ACLU, which, after internal debate, decided to take a public position against capital punishment and
press its arguments, less in the courts than in legislative arenas and public forums. See KIRCHMEIER,
supra note 1, at 80–81 (noting that some later mused that, had the money and energy directed into the
litigation effort overseen by LDF been channeled instead into lobbying for legislative repeal, in an era
when public opposition to the death penalty had grown large, capital punishment might have ended via
this legislative route); see also STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 250–
51 (2002) (same); Muller, supra note 30, at 175–80 (faulting LDF’s failure fully to consider the risky
public relations dimensions of its capital representations). Despite the national-level division of labors
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The next six years were fraught with legal and judicial drama. In the
years from 1965 to 1971, some aspects of the campaign went according to
plan, while others skewed wildly in unexpected directions. The moratorium
strategy succeeded beyond expectations: despite a flow of new capital
convictions and death sentences in some forty-one states, the last execution
carried out in any American jurisdiction occurred in Colorado in 1967.44
Virtually every other death-sentenced inmate was protected by pleadings
filed in some state or federal court that asserted one or more of the LDF
issues.45 Many counsel persuaded local judges, moreover, that they should
hold those issues in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s ultimate
disposition in “some other case.” Scores of state and federal judges, hardpressed for time, proved frequently quite willing to let these difficult
habeas cases sink toward the bottom of their busy dockets.46 The pileup of
death-sentenced inmates awaiting execution gradually grew to 435 by 1967
and to over 620 by 1972.47
Meanwhile, of great significance for the Supreme Court’s ultimate
treatment of racial discrimination claims in capital cases, Professor
Wolfgang’s study results began to come in. The data revealed that black
defendants in his survey were indeed nearly seven times more likely to
receive a death sentence than white defendants (13% vs. 2%), a rate that
rose to eighteen times as many death sentences when the defendant was
black and the victim was white (36% vs. 2%).48 Significantly, these wide
racial disparities did not diminish when Wolfgang carried out multiple

between LDF and the ACLU, some of the most vigorous statewide efforts involved state ACLU
branches in Georgia, Florida, California, and elsewhere. WOLFE, supra note 26, at 230–42.
44
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 81–82; see also Hugo Adam Bedau, Background and
Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 27, at 24, 25 tbl.1-3 (titled “Prisoners
Executed Under Civil Authority in the United States, 1930–1980”).
45
WOLFE, supra note 26, at 309–10.
46
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 92.
47
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 81–82; Hugo Adam Bedau, The Laws, the Crimes, and the
Executions, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 27, at 63 tbl.2-3-4 (titled “Prisoners on
Death Row by Year, Race, and Sex, 1968–80” and reporting that 642 inmates were awaiting execution
at the close of the year 1971).
48
Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 27, at 200–01. David Baldus later summarized the study’s design
as follows:
Wolfgang’s data set included information on a wide variety of legitimate case characteristics.
Indeed, in terms of the number of legitimate background variables for which data were available,
his was the most sophisticated empirical investigation of sentencing yet conducted at that time.
The data allowed Wolfgang to control one at a time for over two dozen variables (such as prior
record, contemporaneous robbery, weapon, and victims’ age). . . . Wolfgang found that adjusting
for none of these legitimate background variables reduced the strong race effects initially
observed.
DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS 250–51 (1990).
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regression analyses to test whether race-neutral factors or others among the
twenty-nine variables in each case might actually be driving the
differences.49
An Arkansas federal district judge eventually agreed to hear these
racial claims. Amsterdam and LDF counsel presented Dr. Wolfgang and
his data on behalf of death-sentenced inmate William Maxwell.50 Following
the hearing, first the district court51 and then the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion authored by then-Circuit
Judge Harry Blackmun,52 rejected Maxwell’s racial claim for several
reasons. First, despite the statistical significance of Wolfgang’s overall
racial patterns, Maxwell’s case had arisen, by chance, in an Arkansas
county that was not part of Wolfgang’s sample, so there was no direct
evidence comparing what prosecutors and juries in Maxwell’s own county
had done in other rape cases.53 Second, Blackmun noted that Wolfgang had
not collected data on additional factors about each crime that might
conceivably have affected the sentencing outcomes.54 Finally, Wolfgang’s
sample of death-sentenced Arkansas cases similar to Maxwell’s included
only fifty-five cases, too few to reach scientifically reliable answers.55
Blackmun famously concluded: “We are not certain that, for Maxwell,
statistics will ever be his redemption.”56
LDF subsequently filed a comprehensive petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court, its ultimate target all along, raising Maxwell’s racial
claim as well as LDF’s claims about the absence of a bifurcated
proceeding, the lack of any sentencing guidance for the jury, and a jury

49
Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 27, at 201–04; see also id. at 204 (noting that “[w]hether or not a
contemporaneous offense has been committed, if the defendant is black and the victim is white, the
defendant is about eighteen times more likely to receive the death penalty than when the defendant is in
any other racial combination of defendant and victim”). The researchers added:
Over two dozen possibly aggravating nonracial variable that might have accounted for the higher
proportion of blacks than whites sentenced to death upon conviction of rape have been analyzed.
Not one of these nonracial factors has withstood the tests of statistical significance. . . . This is a
striking conclusion. . . . All the nonracial factors in each of the states analyzed “wash out,” that is,
they have no bearing on the imposition of the death penalty in disproportionate numbers upon
blacks. The only variable of statistical significance that remains is race.
Id.; see also Marvin E. Wolfgang, Blacks and the Law, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119
(1973) (further describing his study).
50
GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 444–45 (describing testimony in the district court hearing).
51
Maxwell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Ark. 1966).
52
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968); MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 103–05; WOLFE,
supra note 26, at 284–86.
53
Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 146.
54
Id. at 147.
55
MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 94–102.
56
Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 148.
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selection process that excluded jurors hesitant about the death penalty.
Strikingly, the Court agreed to grant review and hear all these issues except
Maxwell’s racial claim, a claim the liberal Warren Court went out of its
way not to entertain, despite the presentation in the case of the full
Wolfgang study, tested in trial litigation.57
After Maxwell v. Bishop was argued in March of 1969,58 an initial
internal vote showed the Justices ready, by an eight-to-one margin, to strike
down Maxwell’s sentence on one of the broad due process grounds.59 Yet
the apparent consensus was a shaky one, since some Justices apparently
preferred the bifurcation issue, while others found the guided-sentencingdiscretion issue more compelling. When Justice Douglas tried to draft an
opinion that embraced both issues, he failed to attract five votes for his
efforts.60
In the meantime, the Court’s membership was about to undergo
seismic change. Chief Justice Earl Warren had announced in the spring of
1968 that he would step down at the end of the following Term. Moreover,
Abe Fortas—who had succeeded Arthur Goldberg and whom President
Johnson hoped to name the new Chief Justice as Warren’s replacement—
first found his nomination to become Chief Justice stalled in the Senate in
the fall of 1968 and then found himself accused of financial misconduct the
following spring, prompting his resignation from the Court on May 14,
1969.61
These events took place in the immediate aftermath of a tumultuous
presidential election in which the country had chosen former Republican
Vice President Richard Nixon over the Democratic Vice President Hubert
Humphrey. Nixon had campaigned vigorously in 1968 on a “law and
order” platform,62 and he soon fulfilled that promise by replacing Chief
Justice Warren with the far more conservative Warren Burger, who had
earlier, as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, clashed with more liberal judges over criminal law

57

MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 148.
See id. at 158–67 (providing a summary of the arguments by Anthony G. Amsterdam and Albert
W. Harris, Jr. in Maxwell).
59
LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE 63, 339 n.71
(1992); MANDERY, supra note 19, at 83.
60
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 84; MANDERY, supra note 19, at 83–84, 89.
61
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 100; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 186.
62
See Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime
Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 14–16 (2013) (discussing Nixon’s 1968 strategy emphasizing the need for
public safety as a rationale for his law and order promises).
58
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issues.63 President Nixon then replaced liberal Abe Fortas with Harry
Blackmun, the very Eighth Circuit judge who had rejected Maxwell’s
claims.64
Suddenly, neither of the due process issues in Maxwell’s case
commanded a majority. The Court instead ordered reargument for May 4,
1970, and eventually reversed Maxwell’s death sentence on a narrower,
death-qualification ground, making no new constitutional law.65 The Court
then took two death cases, McGautha v. California66 and Crampton v.
Ohio,67 which had been litigated by non-LDF attorneys, to consider the due
process issues unresolved in Maxwell itself. In 1971, Justice John Harlan,
writing for six Justices in McGautha, declared that the Due Process Clause
did not constitutionally compel states to accept LDF’s long-pursued
guided-discretion approach. His coolly analytic decision asked instead
whether any comprehensive standards for classifying the death-worthiness
of each case could ever be developed.68 He likewise found no constitutional
obligation for states to conduct bifurcated proceedings.69 It appeared the
breakthrough moment for LDF’s constitutional campaign had come and
gone.
Indeed, the 1970s appeared to have ushered in an autumnal chill for
every aspect of the LDF campaign.70 Not only had core liberal members of
the reform-minded Warren Court been replaced by a cohort of more
conservative Justices, but the country itself had moved in a notably more
conservative direction. The widespread optimism of the early Kennedy
years had largely vanished after the assassinations of John Kennedy, Martin
Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, the urban riots of the mid-to-late
63

LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 102.
Id.
65
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (per curiam); KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 84; see
MANDERY, supra note 19, at 95–96; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 199–211; WOLFE, supra note 26, at
303–04.
66
402 U.S. 183 (1971).
67
Id. (stating that the Court heard Crampton together with McGautha).
68
Id. at 204 (“To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can
be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond
present human ability.”); see MANDERY, supra note 19, at 107–11; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 240–
42.
69
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 210 (“To say that the two-stage jury trial . . . is probably the fairest, as
some commentators and courts have suggested, and with which we might well agree were the matter
before us in a legislative or rulemaking context, is a far cry from a constitutional determination that this
method of handling the problem is compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)). The
Court’s treatment here has been brilliantly analyzed by Professor Robert Weisberg. Robert Weisberg,
Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305.
70
MANDERY, supra note 19, at 111–14.
64
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1960s, and the relentless war in Vietnam.71 Crime, including homicide, had
begun to climb, and popular support for the death penalty had increased.72
President Nixon and his Attorney General John Mitchell repeatedly
asserted that federal judges and the Supreme Court should engage in “strict
construction” of the Constitution and nothing beyond.73 Before the end of
1972, President Nixon would remake the Supreme Court with his third and
fourth nominations, replacing the retiring Justices Black and Harlan with
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist, both of them strongly skeptical
about any judicial role in restricting the latitude of state criminal
proceedings.74
Yet, to the surprise of many, despite these adverse changes in both
Court personnel and the public mood, in 1972, in four capital cases that
included Furman v. Georgia,75 the Supreme Court finally gave LDF and
Amsterdam the broad victory they had sought for eight years—vacating not
just the death sentences of the four defendants before the Court, but every
death sentence, and every death penalty statute, in every American
jurisdiction.76 Although LDF’s Due Process Clause challenges had been
rejected in McGautha a term earlier, the Court invited new argument on the
question whether the “imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in
(these cases) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?”77
LDF’s Director/Counsel Jack Greenberg and Anthony Amsterdam
presented the arguments for the defendants. Greenberg, who represented
the defendants in the two rape cases, made passing use of the Wolfgang
evidence of racial bias to emphasize that death for rape was a penalty used
primarily in the South against black defendants and was therefore
“unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.78 Amsterdam embroidered an
elaborate Eighth Amendment theme, pressing the idea that while the
Constitutional text expressly recognized, and thus implicitly approved,
71

See THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 (1969).
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 92–93.
73
See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS
L. REV. 383, 419, 430 (2000).
74
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 86; LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 104–05.
75
408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). The other three cases were Aikens v. California, Branch v. Texas, and
Jackson v. Georgia. The Court heard Furman together with Branch and Jackson, while hearing Aikens
separately. See Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972). All four cases involved African-American
defendants convicted for crimes against white victims. Aikens and Furman had been convicted of
murder, Branch and Jackson, of rape. MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 246.
76
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 89. A total of 589 prisoners were spared execution by the Court’s
decision.
77
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
78
MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 268, 275–77.
72
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governmental use of the death penalty, capital punishment had since
become an atavism, a relic of an earlier age, a penalty no longer supported
or regularly applied.79 His intertwined theme, enlarging on the first, was
that those death sentences still being imposed were being meted out in a
handful of arbitrary, capriciously chosen cases that made its imposition
“freakish” and “unusual,” violating core Eighth Amendment principles.80
Justice Byron White later remarked to a colleague after Amsterdam’s
argument in Furman that he had “never seen a better oral advocate.”81
The Court proved deeply divided; although it struck down the death
penalties in every case before it, the Court split five to four, with each of
the nine Justices writing separately to produce the longest set of opinions in
one case in the Court’s history.82 The five opinions of the majority Justices
varied in rationale. Justices Douglas, Potter Stewart, and Thurgood
Marshall all acknowledged in passing that racial minorities and the poor
bore the heaviest burden of death sentencing,83 but most of the Justices
chose not to reflect at all on the penalty’s racial effects. Two key short
decisions authored by Justices White and Stewart relied principally on the
penalty’s freakishness and unusualness. The death penalty, Justice White
added, was used so seldom that it no longer served either of its chief
penological justifications—neither deterrence nor retribution.84 Notably for
our later discussion of McCleskey, Justice Lewis Powell, new to the Court
in 1972, wrote by far the longest and most passionate dissent in Furman; it
ran to more than fifty printed pages. Powell devoted several pages to
parrying claims that racial disparities infected capital sentencing in 1972,
attributing such evidence either to past practices now largely abandoned or
to the ostensible fact that “[t]he ‘have-nots’ in every society always have
been subject to greater pressure to commit crimes and to fewer constraints
than their more affluent fellow citizens.”85
79

See Brief for Petitioner at 6–7, Aikens, 406 U.S. 813 (No. 68-5027), 1971 WL 134168, at *15–

18.
80

Id. at 49–55; MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 269–70; WOLFE, supra note 26, at 378.
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 114.
82
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 220
(1979) (observing that “[t]he nine separate opinions totaled 50,000 words, 243 pages—the longest
decision in the Court’s history”).
83
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249–52, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 364–66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
84
Id. at 310–14 (White, J., concurring).
85
Id. at 414, 447–50 (Powell, J., dissenting). Woodward and Armstrong report that Justice Powell
acknowledged that “[b]lacks probably had been discriminated against and more often given death
sentences, just as they had been discriminated against in every other way. But these were things of the
past.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 82, at 214. Powell apparently assumed such injustices
were unlikely to persist, because of the increased presence of black jurors on capital juries and the
81
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Death row inmates and lawyers at LDF could celebrate their
remarkable victory only for a short time,86 since a broad public backlash
against Furman was powerful and immediate. Amsterdam had assured the
Justices that capital punishment was a leftover relic of an earlier day. Yet
fierce public outcry against the decision and prompt reenactment of capital
statutes by thirty-five state legislatures appeared to show that the penalty
remained important to many citizens and their representatives.87 The Court
and the abolitionist forces came in for broad criticism, not only from state
and local executive and legislative leaders, but eventually from President
Gerald Ford’s Solicitor General, Robert Bork, who weighed in aggressively
in support of states defending against death penalty challenges.88
State attorneys general and legislators, however determined they may
have been to reenact capital statutes, nonetheless poured over the language
and logic of Furman. In consequence, virtually every state adopted one or
more of the procedural reforms that had been pressed by LDF through the
late 1960s. Roughly half chose both to bifurcate all death cases and to
legislate a roster of “aggravating” and “mitigating” factors that could guide
the discretion of their capital juries.89
A second wave of constitutional challenges to these new statutes was
inevitable, and the battle was joined in cases from five states: Georgia,
Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina. While LDF’s constitutional
attacks came from several directions, its chief contentions reiterated its
claim in Furman that capital punishment inevitably violated the Eighth
Amendment. In the alternative, LDF argued that even if the evenhanded
application of the penalty was theoretically possible, these new state
procedures were not actually working to curb arbitrariness in practice;
Warren Court’s expansion of other criminal procedural protections—protections that could be deployed
to rectify individual instances of discrimination without the need to strike all death sentences. Id.
Indeed, while rejecting the petitioner’s argument to invalidate all capital sentences under the Eighth
Amendment, Powell’s opinion ironically invoked the Wolfgang study to suggest a possible equal
protection avenue, suggesting that “Maxwell does point the way to a means of raising the equal
protection challenge that is more consonant with precedent and the Constitution’s mandates than the
several courses pursued by today’s concurring opinions.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Time was to test, of course, whether Justice Powell, when faced with a far more
thoroughgoing statistical showing of discrimination than Wolfgang’s, would actually apply an Equal
Protection Clause analysis to redress proven discrimination in capital sentencing.
86
MANDERY, supra note 19, at 239–41 (recounting Amsterdam’s immense personal sense of relief
when learning that his many clients had been spared from death, and likewise, the LDF capital
punishment staff’s late-night celebration, elatedly chanting out, one by one, the names of their clients).
87
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 111.
88
Id. at 114; see EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 59, at 97–98; MANDERY, supra note 19, at 247–
58.
89
WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864–1982, at
194–95 (1974); LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 111–12.
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instead, they merely papered it over with high-sounding but ineffective
procedures that still allowed unchecked discretion.90
The Supreme Court’s eventual decisions in these five cases in 1976
represented a major defeat for LDF and its allies. The decisions indeed set
the constitutional foundation for all capital sentencing litigation that has
followed. In a set of three-Justice plurality opinions coauthored by Justices
Stewart, Powell, and John Paul Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia,91 Proffitt v.
Florida,92 and Jurek v. Texas,93 and a second set authored by Justice White
for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist, the Court first
decided that the Eighth Amendment did not forbid use of the death penalty
under all circumstances.94 It then carefully examined the specific
procedures each state had put in place since 1973 and concluded that each
appeared to satisfy the core constitutional concerns that had prompted the
Court’s decision in Furman four years earlier.95
In the years following its 1976 decisions, the Court decided, favorably
to capital defendants, a number of additional cases that gradually
circumscribed state sentencing authority along two dimensions. First, the
Court repeatedly took steps to limit the kinds of crimes for which death
could be imposed and the defendants who could be charged capitally.96
Second, it refined and augmented the requisite procedural requirements
necessary to assure “super due process” in capital sentencing.97 Pertinent to
90
EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 59, at 102–03; KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 97. Amsterdam’s
“intense moral and emotional commitment” apparently did not play nearly so well during the 1976 oral
arguments as they had in Furman. When the Court tested his argument by wondering whether the
commandant at Buchenwald, or an airline terrorist, or the perpetrator of a hydrogen explosion in New
York City might be executed, Amsterdam repeatedly replied in the negative. Several Justices found his
inflexibility on this point “self-righteous.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 82, at 433–34. One
Justice reportedly commented in exasperation, “Now I know what it’s like to hear Jesus Christ.”
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 114.
91
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
92
428 U.S. 242 (1976).
93
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
94
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176–87.
95
Id. at 187–206; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247–60; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268–77. The Court did decide,
however, to strike the capital statutes of the states of North Carolina and Louisiana, which had proposed
to eliminate arbitrariness by automatically imposing death sentences on all defendants convicted of any
capital crime. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
96
DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF
ABOLITION 270–71 (2010) (noting the Court’s series of post-Gregg decisions that eventually forbade
the death penalty for rapists, robbers, the insane, the mentally infirm, and juvenile offenders).
97
Id. at 263–67 (noting that, in addition to narrowing the categories of defendants constitutionally
eligible for death, the Court engaged in the “juridification” of certain additional capital sentencing
procedures between 1976 and the mid-1980s, in such decisions as: Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977) (forbidding a Florida judge to impose a death sentence based on evidence contained in a pre-
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our later consideration of McCleskey, one of the Court’s first post-1976
decisions came in 1977 in Coker v. Georgia,98 where the Court finally took
up the issue of the death penalty as punishment for rape. Rape was, of
course, the very crime, and death, the very punishment, that had originally
impelled LDF’s death penalty campaign. Yet strikingly, neither Justice
White’s opinion for four Justices, nor any of the concurring or dissenting
opinions in Coker, ever mentioned race, the Wolfgang evidence, or the
nation’s broader history of discrimination in rape cases at all. Instead,
White rested his decision upon the principle that death was constitutionally
disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment for a crime that did not
extinguish life.99 Once again, the Court chose not to confront the systematic
racial disparities, even in rape cases where wide and persistent racial
disparities had long been the punishment’s most distinguishing feature.
Amsterdam responded to the constitutional defeat in the 1976 cases
with a self-enforced period of contemplation of the various decisions
rendered by the Court. He returned to the fray within a few weeks, armed
with a new packet of more than one-hundred legal-sized pages. Each page
designated some possible claim he found lurking in the interstices of the
Court’s decisions in Gregg, Proffitt, Jurek, Woodson, and Roberts. For
each possible new claim, Amsterdam recited constitutional authority,
drawn from language in the 1976 cases or from earlier decisions of the
Court that could fortify the argument, then assessed the strength of the
claim, offered tactical considerations, and added a summary description of
all evidence needed to substantiate the claim. Affectionately known by
LDF staffers as “the ridiculous memo,” this one-hundred-plus-page
document guided much of LDF’s capital work for the coming decade.100
Prominent among the new claims remained LDF’s lodestar: challenges to
capital sentencing regimes for arbitrariness and racial discrimination in
practice.
My own connections with LDF began in the summer of 1976, when I
volunteered to work with a seasoned partner in my New York law firm to
represent Jerry Jurek—Texas’s “named defendant” in the 1976 case—as
sentencing report that the defendant had no state right to confront and rebut); Green v. Georgia,
442 U.S. 95 (1979) (insisting that a capital defendant must be allowed to proffer mitigating evidence in
a capital sentencing proceeding, even if otherwise violative of a state hearsay rule); Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420 (1980) (striking a Georgia aggravating circumstance as too vague and amorphous); and
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (faulting Florida’s procedures for determining whether a
condemned inmate was insane and, therefore, ineligible to be executed), before the Court began to turn
away from these ameliorative procedural requirements in the following decade)).
98
433 U.S. 584 (1977).
99
Id. at 597–600.
100
MANDERY, supra note 19, at 426–27.
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his case moved into state and federal post-conviction proceedings. Eighteen
months later, in January of 1978, I joined LDF full time as its most junior
capital punishment attorney, overseen by Jack Greenberg, three more
senior LDF attorneys, and Anthony Amsterdam, who became a mentor for
the subsequent twelve years.
LDF concentrated some of its energies in 1977 and 1978 on knitting
together a revived national network of volunteer counsel for every deathsentenced inmate and litigating other post-Gregg issues. Yet the question
whether capital statutes were discriminatory and arbitrary never left LDF’s
agenda. Various eminent social scientists had already begun analyzing
homicide data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports files to see whether
racial factors appeared to be playing an impermissible role in post-Furman
capital sentencing.101 And in 1979, David Baldus, a law professor at the
University of Iowa and a coauthor of a highly respected text on the use of
statistics in proving discrimination,102 began a National Institute of Justicefunded, before-and-after study of 156 pre-Furman death cases and 594
post-Furman cases in Georgia, modeling two decision points: prosecutorial
decisions on whether to move murder convictions to a sentencing phase,
and jury decisions on whether to impose a life or a death sentence. This
Procedural Reform Study, as Baldus named it, was by far the most
ambitious post-Furman study to that point.103
Meanwhile, Jack Greenberg, LDF’s Director/Counsel, had gone
searching for a generous funder who might provide major support for a
state-of-the-art empirical study of post-Furman capital sentencing. Once he
obtained the then-huge $250,000 commitment from the Edna McConnell
Clark Foundation, LDF turned to the selection of an appropriate expert.104 I
was only minimally involved in the decision to choose David Baldus, but I
recall early meetings between Baldus, Greenberg, Amsterdam, and other
101

See, e.g., SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 35–105 (1989); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 590–91
(1980); Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the
Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783, 789 (1981); Michael
L. Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM . SOC. REV. 918
(1981); Marc Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposition of the Death Penalty: A Comparison of the
Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced Pre-Furman and Post-Furman, 49 TEMP. L. Q. 261, 282–85
(1976); Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience,
95 HARV. L. REV. 456, 458–59 (1981).
102
DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W. L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980).
103
See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 42–44 (1990).
104
David Baldus et al., McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): Denial, Avoidance, and the Legitimization of
Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 229,
246 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009); see also LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 167.
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LDF staffers (for I had volunteered to serve as LDF’s social science
liaison—one of the best poorly-thought-out decisions I ever made) and I
soon became immersed in the ongoing effort.
LDF’s agreement with Baldus was simple and straightforward: he
would conduct a major study of capital sentencing in some Southern state,
using Clark Foundation funds to meet the expenses of the research. If
Baldus found no discrimination, he would be free to publish his findings
wherever he chose. If he did chance to find discrimination however, he
would share his findings and agree to testify for LDF in some capital
proceeding.105 Baldus was honest and forthright from the outset: he
candidly stated that he did not believe he would find substantial
discrimination by race. He surmised that between the various criminal
procedure reforms approved by the Supreme Court and the ongoing civil
rights progress being made in the South, capital charging and sentencing
decisions had probably become evenhanded. Lawyers at LDF were pleased
with Baldus’s initial stance; it seemed far wiser to solicit data and analysis
from a conscientious social scientist initially skeptical of the racial
hypothesis than to retain someone predisposed from the outset to credit it.
The design of the study was crucially important to all parties. LDF
had long suspected that any continuing discrimination might well manifest
itself not at the penalty phase, where Baldus’s Procedural Reform Study
had focused, but at earlier stages of capital prosecutions: a prosecutor’s
choice to charge a homicide as murder rather than some lesser offense; a
prosecutor’s refusal to accept a plea of guilty in exchange for a
commitment not to press for a death sentence; or a jury’s choice to convict
for murder rather than for a lesser included offense. Baldus was quite
willing to obtain evidence on decisions made at each of these stages.106 He
was also eager to expand his already large roster of variables to include
every possible factor bearing on a prosecutorial or jury decision that could
be suggested by any cooperative prosecutor, judge, or defense attorney,
including variables designed to capture the “strength of the evidence” in
each case.107 Baldus and his colleagues ultimately designed a revised and
much-expanded questionnaire for the study with over 400 variables.108 They
then drew a stratified sample of 1,066 cases from all 2,484 Georgia cases,
within the 1973–1979 period, in which a defendant had been arrested,
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charged with homicide, and later convicted either of murder or of voluntary
manslaughter.109
Georgia was chosen as the state for further inquiry for several
principal reasons. By far the most important was the unique access Georgia
afforded to necessary data. Unlike most other states, where collecting data
required extended field trips to scores of county courthouses, Georgia had
already done most of the collection work itself, for Georgia operated a
system under which its Board of Pardons and Paroles already gathered the
criminal files on every prisoner incarcerated anywhere within the system.
The board’s offices in Atlanta therefore contained a treasure trove of data,
including actual police reports, witness statements taken by police or
prosecutors, and prosecutors’ notes, in addition to formal documents such
as indictments, judgments, and the like.110 A trained group of law students,
overseen by an experienced graduate data collector, gathered the data for
Baldus in the summer of 1981, working principally from Pardon & Parole
Board files.111
Beyond his rich intellectual gifts, four interrelated characteristics
shaped David Baldus’s work: scrupulous honesty; a deep knowledge of
statistical and methodological alternatives; a readiness to test, reexamine,
and vary all of his methods and assumptions; and an indefatigable
commitment to take every step necessary to assure the integrity of his own
work. Throughout the litigation, Baldus repeatedly showed himself willing
to question his overall design, accept any reasonable coding or modeling
suggestions, and retest all alternative hypotheses that might explain his
tentative conclusions.112
109

Id. at 45, 67 n.10 (describing the sampling methods and choices).
Id. at 310.
111
Id. at 46. During the oral argument before the Supreme Court, Justice White attempted to make
an issue of qualifications of the data gatherers, noting they were merely “law students, as opposed to
law graduates.” LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 202–03. In fact, the data project overseer, Edward Gates,
was a law graduate and experienced empiricist who had earlier collected data for Baldus’s Procedural
Reform Study and still earlier, for cancer research at Yale. He and Professor Baldus had personally
selected the law student coders through a competitive process and then trained them on scene at the
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. Gates remained throughout the summer, offering both personal
oversight and a written protocol designed to instruct the coders on any matters of ambiguity. Gates
regularly double-checked their work by instructing the coders who had completed a file to switch files
randomly with another coder, to recode, and then compare the coding of each coder so as to assure
uniformity. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 452.
112
See Samuel R. Gross, David Baldus and the Legacy of McCleskey v. Kemp, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1905, 1924 (2012) (noting that “Baldus’s achievement in McCleskey is as much as anything a testament
to his character—that of a tireless, selfless, passionate, inquisitive scientist”); id. at 1911 (contrasting
Baldus’s exemplary research approach—“Why not find out everything about every case?”—with that of
other fine researchers); see also BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 323 (describing Baldus’s willingness,
during the federal hearing, to accept a predictive, death-sentencing model proposed by the federal judge
110
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The Georgia coding went forward in Atlanta during the summer of
1981; Baldus and Woodward carried out their data entry, cleaning, and
initial analysis over the winter and spring of 1982.113 In the meantime, LDF
was advising lawyers throughout the State of Georgia to be sure to plead
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment discrimination and arbitrariness claims
in all of their capital cases and to request evidentiary hearings to
demonstrate these disparities.114
Late in May of 1982, Professor Baldus telephoned me to share big
news: his still-preliminary first data analyses revealed, to his surprise, that
racial factors were indeed still playing an important role in Georgia’s
capital sentencing system. Most salient were the race-of-victim disparities
he found. While African-American defendants had received death
sentences in 22% of cases in which their murder victims had been white,
only 8% of white defendant/white victim cases led to death sentences, and
only 1% of black defendant/black victim cases. Multiple regression
analyses performed using different combinations of possibly relevant
alternative factors and varied statistical techniques failed to shake these
racially disparate outcomes.115
At that time, I was serving as LDF’s liaison to Georgia’s capital
defense attorneys, working directly with the state’s active ACLU branch
and other Georgia nonprofit legal organizations.116 Following LDF’s longstanding policies, I let each of them know about Baldus’s research results.
One Atlanta attorney, Robert Stroup, called to say that he was then
representing an inmate whose federal habeas petition had just been denied
by a federal district judge. Without hesitation, we prepared a motion to
reopen the case under Federal Rule 60(b)(2), alleging that Baldus’s recent
findings constituted “newly available evidence.” The federal district judge,
J. Owen Forrester agreed to grant our motion and direct a hearing. The
inmate’s name was Warren McCleskey.117

and then reanalyze his Georgia data employing the judge’s model—an experiment that yielded racial
disparities in Georgia cases equal to, and even somewhat greater than, those reported using Baldus’s
own models).
113
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 310.
114
Baldus et al., supra note 104, at 247.
115
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 310.
116
In addition to an active state ACLU branch, led by attorney George Kendall and death penalty
coordinator, Patsy Morris, who charted the progress of every capital case, Georgia was blessed with the
presence of the Southern Prisoners’ Defense Committee (later renamed the Southern Center for Human
Rights), led by Steve Bright, the Team Defense Project, led by Millard Farmer, the Southern Regional
Office of the ACLU, and a network of fine and dedicated public defenders and private volunteer
counsel.
117
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 184–85; Baldus et al., supra note 104, at 247–48.
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The Court allowed just over a year for the parties to exchange
documents and carry out depositions of Baldus and the State’s expert
witnesses. In August of 1983, Judge Forrester heard the matter over a
period of eight days. Our challenge was how best to present Professor
Baldus’s sophisticated study, which by then had been expanded to include
dozens of overlapping analyses (cross-tabulations, ordinary least squares
regressions, logistical regressions, stepwise regressions, and qualitative
comparisons using vignettes) carried out in a huge variety of ways (from
parsimonious eight- or nine-factor models to a 230-variable model, with
dozens of alternatives in between). The choice was not among which
models to employ and defend, since virtually all models, even the huge
230-variable model, showed race-of-victim effects that achieved statistical
significance at a .01 level or greater.118 The challenge was to emphasize
why this uniformity of racial findings across all of Baldus’s multiplicity of
alternative analyses was such a great strength of his study, without
somehow allowing our description of the various technical alternatives to
create overload or confusion.119
At the hearing, once I had presented Professors Baldus and George
Woodworth, my co-counsel Timothy Ford, an Amsterdam protégé and
longtime LDF cooperating attorney, presented Professor Richard Berk of
the University of California at Santa Barbara, who had previously
conducted a review of modern criminal sentencing research for the
National Academy of Sciences, to assess Baldus’s work. Berk testified to
the outstanding quality and reliability of the Baldus studies and rendered an
unqualifiedly positive assessment: “[T]his is far and away the most
complete and thorough analysis of sentencing that’s been done. I mean
there’s nothing even close.”120
The State took an extremely defensive posture throughout the hearing.
It offered no alternative data analysis at all. Instead, it made three basic
118

BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 317–18 tbl.51.
Baldus thoroughly described this statistical presentation in his subsequent book. Id. at 311–39.
120
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 907 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Johnson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Richard Berk’s assessment). Professor Welsh White likewise
described the Baldus study as “the most exhaustive study of racial discrimination in capital sentencing
that has ever been conducted.” WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 128 (1987). In 1990, the United
States General Accounting Office published an analysis of twenty-eight studies and acknowledged a
pattern of racial disparities in capital charging and sentencing by race. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES
5–6 (1990) (“To summarize, the synthesis supports a strong race of victim influence. The race of
offender influence is not as clear cut and varies across a number of dimensions. Although there are
limitations to the studies’ methodologies, they are of sufficient quality to support the synthesis
findings.”).
119
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arguments in avoidance: first, that Baldus’s data was so dirty and unreliable
that no results could be relied on; second, that black-victim cases as a
whole were different, and usually less aggravated, than white-victim cases;
and third, that, in any event, every capital case was so unique, and the
relevant considerations so vast in number, that no meaningful comparisons
were possible. LDF’s response to the first objection noted that Baldus had
drawn his data directly from Georgia police and prosecutors’ working files.
These Georgia officials had plainly considered their own files sufficiently
reliable to use them as a basis for making their life or death charging and
sentencing decisions. Addressing the State’s hypothesis that Georgia’s
black-victim homicides were, on the whole, less aggravated than whitevictim cases, Baldus responded that the State’s observation missed the
point. The key question was whether black-victim cases and white-victim
cases at similar levels of aggravation were being treated similarly. The data
showed they were not.121
Finally, the State’s assertion that each capital case was unique and
incomparable could not begin to account for Baldus’s finding that the
overall pattern of charging and sentencing in Georgia otherwise conformed
to the statute’s intended design: leaving race aside, prosecutors and juries
regularly imposed death as punishment in more aggravated cases and life in
less aggravated cases. Moreover, the State could point to no specific
factors, which, if added to the mix, would work to explain, extinguish, or
even significantly diminish the clear racial disparities that marked the
system’s performance.122
Judge Forrester had been appointed to the federal bench by President
Ronald Reagan after a professional career as strike force prosecutor for the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. He proved throughout the hearing to be an
honest, decent, and conscientious judge. Yet the power of Baldus’s
complex statistical case appeared to elude him. Though this Georgia Tech
graduate possessed an intuitive understanding of people and human nature,
he seemed lost once Baldus’s testimony moved beyond cross-tabular
results—where every tested factor is visible and every case is included in
some cell—to the more rarified mathematical world of regression
analysis.123
Six months after the hearing, Judge Forrester entered an order denying
relief to Warren McCleskey on his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

121

BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 463–64.
Baldus et al., supra note 104, at 254 n.64.
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See GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 136–38, 153 n.21 (critiquing the district court’s
opinion and examining some of its methodological misunderstandings).
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racial discrimination claims.124 Forrester’s opinion faulted nearly every
aspect of Baldus’s study: the data sources on which Baldus had relied; his
data collection and cleaning methods; some apparent inconsistences
between the earlier Procedural Reform Study and the Charging and
Sentencing Study; his treatment of variables coded as “unknown” in cases
where no definitive clarity about their presence appeared in the record; the
absence of data on factors in some of the cases; his use of a thirty-ninevariable model; his ostensibly low R-squared statistics; and the
multicollinearity of some of his larger models.125 The Court nonetheless
granted Warren McCleskey a new trial because of a misrepresentation by a
key witness against McCleskey, which, Judge Forrester found, may well
have affected the jury’s judgment on the witness’s credibility, and thus, of
McCleskey’s guilt.126
We appealed the decision, expecting to present argument to a threejudge panel of the Eleventh Circuit after briefs had been filed. Yet the
Eleventh Circuit decided to forgo customary three-judge consideration and
proceed directly to en banc review by all twelve of the Circuit’s judges.127
The oral argument on June 12, 1984 veered between questions about the
statistical evidence and issues of constitutional theory. At one point,
however, Judge Robert Vance of Alabama made an observation about the
potential reach of any ruling for McCleskey: “You say there is racial
discrimination in capital sentencing. Candidly, I think there’s likely to be
discrimination in every kind of criminal case. Just what are we supposed to
do?” I responded that the Supreme Court had held that “death is different,”
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McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 345 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
Id. at 354–64; see BALDUS ET AL., supra note 48, at 340–41, 366 n.84. Baldus later provided an
extensive, methodological critique of the district court’s conclusions. See id. at 450–78. Professor Gross
notes with irony that Judge Forrester (1) first demanded that McCleskey’s analysis must take into
account all relevant factors, (2) then observed that only the method of multiple regression analysis was
capable of doing so, and yet, (3) held that since multivariate analysis does not, by definition, offer proof
of an individual state actor’s state of mind on the issue of intent to discriminate in a particular case,
statistical analysis provided no evidence of value to McCleskey’s claims of discriminatory treatment.
GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 137.
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McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 380–84. McCleskey was able to establish at his federal hearing that
the State had failed fully to disclose to McCleskey’s jury during trial an offer of assistance with pending
federal charges made by the chief police investigator to a key witness against McCleskey. That
nondisclosure violated the well-known Giglio rule, requiring disclosure of any incentive the state has
offered a witness in custody—such as release from custody or a plea reduced charges—in exchange for
trial testimony against a defendant. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). See generally BALDUS
ET AL., supra note 48, at 342, 367 n.86.
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McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 881 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (noting that “[t]his case was
taken en banc principally to consider the argument arising in numerous capital cases that statistical
proof shows the Georgia capital sentencing law is being administered in an unconstitutionally
discriminatory and arbitrary and capricious matter”).
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requiring greater assurance in capital cases against discrimination or
arbitrariness than in other criminal cases. Judge Vance pressed the point:
“What if the racial disparities in armed robbery cases, for example, prove
to be very high?” Former divinity student that I was, I responded that the
court should “gird up its loins” and enter an order banning such
discriminatory sentencing. Judge Vance did not seem satisfied.
Yet the Eleventh Circuit never had to wrestle with the scope of a
favorable decision, for it decided instead to deny all relief to McCleskey on
a nine-to-three vote.128 The majority opinion took an unusual course. While
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure normally provides that the
factual findings of a district court are to be assumed correct on appeal
unless “clearly erroneous,”129 the Circuit chose, without substantial
comment, to discount Judge Forrester’s extensive findings about the
infirmities of the Baldus study, and instead, “review this finding of fact by
assuming the validity of the study,” and “rest [its] holding on the decision
that the study, even if valid, not only supports the district judge’s
decision . . . but compels it.”130
Judge Paul Roney’s opinion then clarified just why the court thought
the Baldus study “compelled” a rejection of McCleskey’s Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims. In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, when racial
discrimination was alleged in a capital sentencing system, both the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
demanded much more than mere proof of a disparate racial impact:
We . . . hold that proof of a disparate impact alone is insufficient to invalidate
a capital sentencing system, unless that disparate impact is so great that it
compels a conclusion that the system is unprincipled, irrational, arbitrary and
capricious such that purposeful discrimination—i.e., race is intentionally
being used as a factor in sentencing—can be presumed to permeate the
system.131

The Court added that statistical evidence has, at best, a marginal role
in demonstrating intent or purpose under such a standard. Even if, as
Baldus’s evidence showed, the influence of race was “more likely than
not,” in a range of cases such as McCleskey’s—and Baldus had shown that
it was likely that only twenty of every thirty-four Georgia defendants
sentenced to death for the murder of a white victim would have received
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Six judges joined Judge Roney’s opinion for seven members of the court. Judges Gerald Tjoflat
and Vance each concurred separately. Id. at 878.
129
FED. R. CIV. P. 52.
130
McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 895.
131
Id. at 892.
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their capital sentence had their victim been black—this more-likely-thannot evidence would still not suffice to make out an Eighth Amendment
violation.132 Moving past this virtually insurmountable Eighth Amendment
standard of proof, the Court declared that neither McCleskey nor any future
defendant could overturn his death sentence on equal protection grounds
without proof of racial animus by a specific actor in his own case, or a
statistical showing of impact “so strong that the only permissible inference
is one of intentional discrimination.”133 In effect, the court of appeals told
McCleskey, Baldus, and LDF: “Go away. Not only is relief denied; this
Court will never seriously entertain another statistical case challenging the
racial justice of our capital sentencing system.” Adding injury to the insult,
the court of appeals also reversed Judge Forrester’s Giglio findings,
concluding that the State’s failure to disclose a detective’s promise to
“speak a word” to federal authorities about pending charges against the
State’s key witness, in exchange for his testimony against McCleskey, did
not amount to a sufficient enough promise to justify a new trial.134
Our petition to the Supreme Court was served on May 28, 1985.135 The
Court chose to hold it for over a year, without decision, pending the
outcome of another LDF capital case being considered by the Court.136
When that case was announced on May 5, 1986, the Court automatically
lifted the “hold” on McCleskey, and we knew a decision on McCleskey’s
petition would be announced shortly thereafter. It came on a sunny summer
morning in July—a short order granting review.137
Candidly, I was surprised when the Court agreed to hear the case. Let
me share the full extent of my naiveté. The Court carefully guards its
overall docket. It declines to hear most petitions filed seeking review, no
matter how strong the claims. These denials leave the lower court decisions
in place, but they do not commit the Court one way or the other on the
merits. Yet once review is granted, the Court must normally address and
132

Id. at 897–98.
Id. at 893 (quoting Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1449 (11th Cir. 1983) and citing
Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858, 859 (5th Cir. 1982)).
134
Judge Roney reasoned that the State’s representations to the jailhouse witness who testified
against McCleskey fell short of a full promise of release from custody, and therefore “offered such a
marginal benefit . . . that it is doubtful it would motivate a reluctant witness, or that disclosure of the
statement [to the jury] would have had any effect on his credibility.” Id. at 884. Alternatively,
completely dismissing the findings of Judge Forrester, he concluded that any Giglio violation was a
harmless error. Id. at 884–85.
135
GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 159.
136
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 187–88 (“[T]he Justices had held McCleskey for another of the
LDF’s death penalty challenges, Lockhardt [sic] v. McCree, a variation on the Court’s 1968 ruling in
Witherspoon v. Illinois.”); see also GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 159.
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McCleskey v. Kemp, 478 U.S. 1019 (1986).
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resolve those merits. And to do so in McCleskey’s case, in my view, put the
Court in a difficult spot.
First, I had become thoroughly convinced of the facts: the Baldus
study seemed extraordinarily robust and sound, not simply because of
Baldus’s expertise, his careful research design, and his evident care, but
because he had so transparently and thoroughly tested his methods and his
findings against every proposed alternative analysis and counterhypothesis,
and because none of those tests had reduced the impact or significance of
the racial disparities he found. The outcomes in all of his alternative
quantitative and qualitative analyses triangulated consistently.
Moreover, after two full years in which to consult with experts of
every stripe, the State of Georgia’s principal response had remained little
more than a “rope-a-dope” defense; Georgia could point to no omitted
variable that would reduce the impact of race, no alternative model,
however far-fetched, that might justify Georgia’s racially skewed
sentencing patterns. Instead, all Georgia could do was recite its knownothing mantra: “Analysis of any capital sentencing patterns is
impossible.”138
Turning from facts to law, it seemed that in dismissing Baldus’s
findings, the Eleventh Circuit majority had grossly distorted both the
Supreme Court’s prior Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence. The Court in 1972 in Furman had struck all the nation’s
capital statutes because of apparent patterns of arbitrariness and
capriciousness. Thereafter, in 1976 and often since, the Court had
reaffirmed that, constitutionally, “death was different.”139 Even though the
Court chose in Gregg to presume that Georgia’s new statutes would work
to cure the ills of Furman, it promised exceptionally close scrutiny of
future capital decisions under the new and higher Eighth Amendment
standards in order to guard against any further risk of arbitrariness—a
higher scrutiny, when death was the penalty imposed, than in any other
criminal justice setting.140
138
See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1, McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279 (No. 84-6811), 1986 WL 727363, at
*1–2 (“The State of Georgia stakes its case largely on two propositions: first that capital cases are so
unique that any statistical analysis of capital sentencing patterns is impossible as a matter of law . . . .”).
139
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“While Furman did not hold that the
infliction of the death penalty per se violates the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments,
it did recognize that the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under
our system of criminal justice.”).
140
See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (“Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year
prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case.”); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357–58 (1977) (noting that
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Moreover, the Court based its key assumption in Gregg—that
Georgia’s new procedures would suffice to cure the deficiencies
condemned in Furman—solely on the absence of any “facts to the
contrary.”141 Yet the Baldus study, in McCleskey v. Kemp, was evidence to
the contrary. How could the High Court, I asked myself, square its own
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with Baldus’s damning new study?
Moreover, while the Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence
had, since Washington v. Davis142 in 1976, demanded proof of intent to
discriminate, Justice Powell, writing for the Court a year later in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,143 had
clearly acknowledged that the invidious intent of a public body was often
difficult to show directly. Consequently, Powell clarified, judges should
undertake “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence . . . as may be available.”144 Justice Stevens had earlier made just
“five Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment
from any other which may be imposed in the country. . . . It is of vital importance to the defendant and
to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (declaring that “[w]hen the
choice is between life and death,” state exclusion of potentially mitigating evidence is a “risk [that] is
unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments”).
141
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225. Justice White’s opinion for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice
Rehnquist in Gregg, concurring in the judgment, expressly founded their approval of Georgia’s postFurman system upon a series of factual assumptions about the system’s likely operation in practice.
Looking first at Georgia’s new roster of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, Justice White
wrote:
The Georgia Legislature has plainly made an effort to guide the jury in the exercise of its
discretion, while at the same time permitting the jury to dispense mercy on the basis of factors too
intangible to write into a statute, and I cannot accept the naked assertion that the effort is bound
to fail.
Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
Turning to the newly designated role of the Georgia judicial branch, which was charged to oversee
sentences and “decid[e] whether in fact the death penalty was being administered for any given class of
crime in a discriminatory, standardless, or rare fashion,” he observed:
[I]f the Georgia Supreme Court properly performs the task assigned to it under the Georgia
statutes, death sentences imposed for discriminatory reasons or wantonly or freakishly for any
given category of crime will be set aside. Petitioner has wholly failed to establish, and has not
even attempted to establish, that the Georgia Supreme Court has failed properly to perform its
task . . . .
Id. at 223–24 (emphasis added).
Looking finally at the role of Georgia prosecutors, Justice White observed:
Petitioner’s argument that prosecutors behave in a standardless fashion in deciding which cases to
try as capital felonies is unsupported by any facts. . . . This is untenable. Absent facts to the
contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decisions by
factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death
penalty if it convicts.
Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
142
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
143
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
144
Id. at 266.
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this point in his concurring opinion in Washington v. Davis:
“[G]overnmental action . . . is frequently the product of compromise, of
collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation. . . . It [would be]
unrealistic . . . to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the
actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker.”145
David Baldus’ evidence, it seemed to me, clearly met Arlington
Heights’s standards: it offered just such a “clear pattern” of collective
governmental decisionmaking in Georgia, and his relentless multivariate
analysis was designed carefully to investigate all possible “grounds other
than race,” that would have explained the racial disparities, all in a criminal
justice system that was, as Justice Stevens aptly put it, “the product of
compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation.”146 In
Baldus’s data, race never disappeared; no other explanations were ever
found.
While the Supreme Court had tinkered with its equal protection
standards in the decade since Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights,
the Court had recently shown practical flexibility in specifying what proof
would be required to show discrimination. Only months before certiorari
was granted in McCleskey, Justice Powell, in Batson v. Kentucky,147 had
expressly reframed the proof necessary to challenge a prosecutor who was
alleged to be exercising peremptory jury challenges to remove jurors on a
racial basis. Writing for seven members of the Court, Justice Powell drew
from Title VII cases a method that (1) required a defendant first to present
prima facie evidence of discrimination—often nothing more than the
prosecutor’s unexplained exclusion of a number of prospective black
jurors—before (2) shifting the burden to the prosecutor to explain, on
nonracial grounds, her choices. If the prosecutor could do so, the final
burden would then (3) shift back to the challenging defendant to show, if
possible, that any ostensible explanation by the prosecutor was
pretextual.148
Such a paradigm seemed remarkably pertinent to the capital
sentencing context, except that Baldus’s evidence had examined, not a
handful of decisions by a single prosecutor, but rather thousands of
decisions, looking at hundreds of factors in each decision over a seven-year
period, a much more powerful prima facie showing than could ever emerge
145
Davis, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens added that it would likewise be
unrealistic “to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper motive affected the
deliberation of a participant in the decisional process.” Id.
146
Id.
147
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
148
Id. at 93–98.
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in a jury selection context, where there were often no more than a few state
decisions to examine. Moreover, nothing seemed a clearer failure of the
Batson paradigm than the State of Georgia’s failure in McCleskey’s case to
offer any plausible explanation for the prima facie racial disparities that
Baldus had demonstrated.
Finally, I reasoned that the Court would surely not falter merely
because of McCleskey’s statistics-heavy factual case. The Court had
regularly entertained and relied upon statistical proof of discrimination in
other circumstances, such as the exclusion of nonwhite citizens from
criminal grand or petit jury pools.149 Both in the Title VII employment
area150 and the Title VIII housing area,151 moreover, statistical proof of
disparate impact had been deemed sufficient to make out a violation.
Indeed, in another case decided in the very spring of McCleskey’s grant of
certiorari, Bazemore v. Friday,152 the Court had relied almost exclusively on
a multivariate regression analysis in condemning a $395 average racial
disparity between the pay of similarly qualified white and black North
Carolina Agricultural Extension Agents.153 Those salary decisions had been
made, in part, by some 100 different local governmental boards, acting
across each of North Carolina’s 100 counties over a period of years.154 How
like prosecutorial or jury decisions, I thought: multiple decisionmakers,
each with a changing membership, acting across scores of counties to make
a series of decisions, over time, with racially disparate outcomes.
149
See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495–96 (1977) (“The disparity proved by the 1970
census statistics showed that the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American, but that, over
an 11-year period, only 39% of the persons summoned for grand jury service were MexicanAmerican. . . . The mathematical disparities that have been accepted by this Court as adequate for a
prima facie case have all been within the range presented here.”); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359
(1970) (using statistical analysis to compare the percentage of black jurors in relation to the overall
population); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (accepting statistical disparity between the
percentage of black individuals on the grand jury and petit jury venires as proof of purposeful
discrimination).
150
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–32 (1971) (using census data to
compare the education levels of white and black employees in determining whether a company’s policy
of requiring a high school diploma had racial purpose or invidious intent).
151
See, e.g., Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977) (affirming that discrimination in housing can be established by statistical evidence of
discriminatory effect); United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir.
1974) (examining whether a housing complex designed to meet the needs of families earning between
$5,000 and $10,000 per year was discriminatory by comparing the relative percentages of the black and
white populations earning that amount). The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that proof of
disparate impact can suffice to establish a violation of Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act. Tex. Dept. of
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
152
478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
153
Id. at 399 (Brennan, J., joined by all other members of the Court, concurring in part).
154
Id. at 389–90.
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To be sure, Bazemore had been a Title VII employment discrimination
case decided per curiam, yet it was not the difference between the statutory
and constitutional standards of proof that seemed most pertinent to me, but
the Court’s confidence in the capacity of the statistical methods to uncover
racial discrimination.155 Moreover, $395 pay differentials, while
indefensible, paled in comparison, I thought, to differences between life
imprisonment and death in an electric chair.
In sum, as I weighed the options, the Court’s decision to deny
certiorari in McCleskey would let the Court “duck” and leave the core
issues unresolved at the highest level.
A grant of review, on the other hand, would leave the Court with few
options but to confront Baldus’s powerful evidence and, I reasoned, to
uphold McCleskey’s claim. This confession of folly did not extend to my
LDF colleagues, nor to Tony Amsterdam, nor to Julius Chambers, who in
1984 had replaced Jack Greenberg as LDF’s Director/Counsel. It revealed
instead my personal habit of untethered hope, which sustained me through
twelve years of full-time capital practice.
What didn’t I know or fully appreciate, on the morning of July 7th,
with certiorari finally granted in McCleskey v. Kemp? Looking
backwards—with the benefit of what we learned during the subsequent
litigation and from the thoughtful scholarship that has followed—I see that
I did not fully appreciate at least seven factors, seven sources of fierce
judicial headwinds that would assault our constitutional vessel.
(1) First, I had sensed, but did not fully understand, just how nettled
the Court had become with LDF’s relentless constitutional attacks, and to
some extent, with the whole style and content of Amsterdam’s campaign.
The Court in 1972 had implicitly accepted LDF’s contention in Furman

155

As Justice Brennan noted for the Court:
The Court of Appeals erred in stating that petitioner’s regression analyses were “unacceptable as
evidence of discrimination,” because they did not include “all measurable variables thought to
have an effect on salary level.” The court’s view of the evidentiary value of the regression
analyses was plainly incorrect. While the omission of variables from a regression analysis may
render the analysis less probative than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some
other infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for the major factors “must be considered
unacceptable as evidence of discrimination.” Normally, failure to include variables will affect the
analysis’ probativeness, not its admissibility.
Importantly, it is clear that a regression analysis that includes less than “all measurable
variables” may serve to prove a plaintiff’s case. A plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not prove
discrimination with scientific certainty; rather, his or her burden is to prove discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence. Whether, in fact, such a regression analysis does carry the
plaintiffs’ ultimate burden will depend in a given case on the factual context of each case in light
of all the evidence presented by both the plaintiff and the defendant. However, as long as the court
may fairly conclude, in light of all the evidence, that it is more likely than not that impermissible
discrimination exists, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail.
Id. at 400–01 (citations omitted).
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that the American death penalty was on its deathbed, shriveling away, its
continued use “cruel” and “unusual” because of its capricious infrequency.
Yet after the Court struck down all capital statutes, thirty-five new state
statutes soon sprang up in their wake, proof positive that LDF had either
overstated its case or underestimated the opposition, but, in either event,
had disappointed a Court which had expected an end to the penalty.156
Moreover, although most of the post-Furman statutes paid implicit
tribute to LDF’s due process critiques by adopting the remedies it had
advocated throughout the 1960s—new bifurcated guilt and penalty trials,
new statutory guidance for sentencing juries on how to weigh aggravating
and mitigating factors, and new limitations on those eligible for death—
still, this medicine once taken, LDF would not relent. Back it came to the
Court in the mid-1970s, insisting the very remedies for which it had pled so
earnestly in principle throughout the 1960s were actually insufficient in
practice to avoid future arbitrariness and discrimination.
The Court’s 1976 decisions had strongly rebuffed LDF’s second wave
of attacks, declaring, after close examination, that the sentencing regimes
crafted by Georgia, Florida, and Texas were conceived in good faith, were
likely to succeed in practice in avoiding system-wide arbitrariness and
discrimination, and thus were constitutional.
Then, back came LDF in McCleskey, in this third wave, now
informing the Justices that all their presumptions in Gregg had been
unfounded, their handiwork infirm: in sum, that they had collectively failed
capital punishment’s biggest constitutional test. Some Justices, at least,
testy at such allegations, had grown weary with the endless rounds of
censure and fault-finding.157
(2) I also did not fully realize how profoundly unhappy the Court had
become with what it viewed as an onslaught of empirical evidence and
statistical proof in capital cases. Just the Term before, in another LDFbacked case before the Court, Lockhart v. McCree,158 the Court had
reversed an en banc victory for death-sentenced inmates rendered by a fiveto-four majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.159 The defendants in Lockhart had amassed a host of well-designed

156
Woodward and Armstrong reported Justice Stewart’s reaction: “When the states began passing
new death penalty laws right after the 1972 Furman decision, Stewart realized that he had
miscalculated. ‘Professor [Anthony] Amsterdam promised us that if we decided his way this would be
the last death case,’ Stewart told his clerks after Furman.” WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 82,
at 432–33.
157
See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 189, 197.
158
476 U.S. 162 (1986).
159
Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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and convergent studies to demonstrate that the exclusion of jurors opposed
to the death penalty at the guilt phase of a capital trial biased the guilt–
innocence deliberations in the State’s favor.160 The studies and the experts
who testified about them during a weeklong hearing had persuaded a
sophisticated and exacting federal trial judge, and later, the Eighth Circuit,
sitting en banc, that the bias was real.161
When the case arrived at the Supreme Court, however, Chief Justice
Burger reportedly declared during the Court’s weekly conference: “Think
of the consequences,” adding that he, for one, was “not going to be ‘bossed
around’ by social scientists.”162 Justice Blackmun added that the whole
claim was “typical Tony Amsterdam.”163 Justice Rehnquist eventually
wrote for six Justices, expressing barely concealed contempt for the
evidence.164 He worked his way through each scientific study, finding flaws
everywhere, then turned on a dime and—in a move to be later imitated by
Justice Powell in McCleskey—declared that the Court would
assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both methodologically
valid and adequate to establish that “death qualification” in fact produces
juries somewhat more “conviction-prone” than “non-death-qualified” juries.
We hold, nonetheless, that the Constitution does not prohibit the States from
“death qualifying” juries in capital cases.165

In effect, Justice Rehnquist held that even if (or more precisely, even
though) the empirical evidence showed that the State was systematically
160

Id. at 232–35.
Chief Judge Donald Lay’s opinion for the Eighth Circuit majority concluded:
In upholding the district court’s finding based upon the evidentiary record we must note: (1) the
record here is exhaustive; it is difficult to perceive how any petitioner could make a record and an
objection to death-qualified juries, as constituting an improper jury for the determination of guiltinnocence, more complete than that presented here; and (2) there are no studies which contradict
the studies submitted; in other words, all of the documented studies support the district court’s
findings.
Id. at 238.
162
LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 189.
163
Id.
164
Lockhart v. McCree 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
165
Id. at 173. Legal counsel for the American Psychological Association, which filed an amicus
curiae brief in Lockhart supporting the findings and conclusions of the lower federal courts, later
observed with dismay
Courts will cite psychological research when they believe it will enhance the elegance of their
opinions but data are readily discarded when more traditional and legally acceptable bases for
decision making are available. . . . [I]t is now clear that even the most unassailable and
methodologically perfect evidence would not have convinced the majority.
Donald N. Bersoff, Social Science Data and the Supreme Court: Lockhart as a Case in Point, 42 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 52, 57 (1987); see also ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 17–18 (1998) (noting a fierce critique of Lockhart by
Professor J. Alexander Tanford).
161
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biasing capital juries in the State’s favor in the determination of guilt or
innocence, the bias did not violate the Sixth Amendment and would be
tolerated. So much for empirical evidence and precise evenhandedness in
capital cases.
(3) A third adverse factor that had clearly gained force throughout the
Burger Court years was federalism, the growing disinclination to secondguess the capital/criminal justice choices of state legislatures and courts.166
Federalism and respect for state legislative choices were, of course, integral
to the design of the American constitutional system, and it had taken nearly
ninety years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment for the
Supreme Court to begin to apply, with some rigor, its own notion of
minimum Due Process Clause standards in state criminal cases. Yet the
Warren Court’s “criminal justice revolution”167 had prompted a strong
countermotion. The Nixon, Ford, and Reagan Administrations, and the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts whose composition they shaped, set out
strongly to restore earlier Supreme Court deference to state criminal
policies. By 1986, a majority of the Justices were determined not to go
further, and indeed, were troubled that they had gone far too far already.168
(4) The Court had also begun to reach the limits of its patience with
the federal writ of habeas corpus, the principal procedure employed by
capital defendants to assert new federal constitutional principles in
attacking their convictions and death sentences. Prior to the mid-1960s,
federal and state habeas corpus filings were relatively infrequent.169 Once a
trial and direct appeal to the state’s highest court had been completed, most
capital inmates’ legal recourse ceased for lack of assigned counsel and lack
of perceived residual claims. In the early 1960s, however, the Warren
Court had opened the federal courts to a much wider variety of challenges

166
See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 82, at 221–22 (noting Rehnquist’s “ideological
commitment to keep the federal courts out of certain types of cases. He argued that state legislatures,
state governments, and state courts should be given the benefit of the doubt when it came to defining
the individual rights of their citizens,” and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
“was misapplied when used to give rights to prisoners, women or other groups”).
167
See discussion and authorities cited supra at note 14.
168
See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT 172 (1995). See generally DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF
THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992).
169
See David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV.
321, 321 (1973) (noting that the number of federal habeas petitions filed nationally rose from a modest
560 in 1950 to 871 in 1960, and then very sharply to 9,063 by 1970); see also MELTSNER, supra note
18, at 94 (observing that when the Supreme Court announced three decisions in 1963, expanding federal
habeas availability, “the impact on death-row inmates was enormous”).
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to state criminal proceedings.170 LDF’s moratorium strategists seized on this
opportunity to conscript the federal habeas writ into use, on newly framed
issues, for virtually all capitally sentenced inmates.171
The normally mild-mannered Justice Powell was especially hostile
toward these consequences. Invited to the Eleventh Circuit Judicial
Conference in 1983, Powell sharply condemned the delays from habeas
review in capital cases and lamented that they “undermine[] public
confidence in our system of justice and the will and ability of the courts to
administer it.”172
(5) Another factor that I underestimated was the difficulty the Court
had in grasping what injustice might flow from racial disparities based on
the race of the victim. While many judges felt some intuitive sympathy for
claimants mistreated or devalued because of their own race, the race of
one’s victim, by contrast, seemed at first blush a fortuity.173 It was not.
170
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (examining whether a state prisoner was deprived of his
constitutional rights because he had been convicted based on a coerced confession); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963) (same).
171
MELTSNER, supra note 18, at 106–09.
172
Remarks of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., at the Eleventh
Circuit Judicial Conference, Savannah, Georgia 8 (May 8–10, 1983). Justice Powell continued his sharp
criticism of the Great Writ, especially in capital cases. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Commentary: Capital
Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (1989). Chief Justice Rehnquist was also dismissive of the writ
and the delays necessarily inherent in federal habeas corpus review. LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 134.
Dean Simon reported that even as a law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson in the 1952 Term, “Rehnquist
had written a memorandum advocating that the Court narrow habeas corpus remedies, expressing
impatience with the many habeas petitions from death row inmates received by the Court.” SIMON,
supra note 168, at 201. Later appointee Sandra Day O’Connor shared this view, adding from the
perspective of a former state appellate judge that federal habeas review “produced a ‘strange’ and
‘imperfect’ duplication of judicial effort ultimately demeaning to state courts.” LAZARUS, supra note
20, at 150 (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State
Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 801 (1981)).
173
Indeed, the internal files of Justice Powell include a memorandum he wrote to the conference
apparently presented on the day the Court considered whether to grant review of McCleskey’s case,
declaring: “I will vote to deny cert. on this issue,” for four principal reasons: first, because “[n]o study
can take all of these individual circumstances into account, precisely because they are fact-specific as to
each defendant”; second, because “the aggravating and mitigating factors in each case differ in ways
that are real but difficult to calibrate”; third, because the Baldus study did not find race-of-defendant
effects, but only race-of-victim effects; and finally, “the study tends to show that the system operates
rationally as a general matter . . . [a] pattern [that] suggests precisely the kind of careful balancing of
individual factors that the Court required in Gregg.” Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to the Conference 3 (June 27, 1986) (located in Justice
Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with the Washington & Lee University School of Law
Library at 19–22), http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/McCleskeyKempBasic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4LZ-WQE9].
Justice White also circulated a rare, pre-argument memorandum in McCleskey to some, though not
all, of the Justices. See Memorandum from Byron White, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., to
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Oct. 15, 1986) (located in Justice
Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with the Washington & Lee University School of Law
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From the time of slavery and the post-Civil War “Black Codes,” states had
regularly imposed more severe punishments to protect white lives,
especially in interracial crimes.174 Black lives, slave or free, scarcely
mattered in early nineteenth century criminal law, as Chief Justice Roger
Taney so memorably observed in Dred Scott v. Sandford.175 Indeed, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause were deliberately framed to counter the reemergence in
the post-Civil War South of new Black Codes under which AfricanAmerican citizens formally received different, and lesser, protection under
criminal laws.176
Even after Southern laws were revised to appear facially neutral,
however, the cultural power of racial subordination constantly manifested
Library at 88–99), http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/McCleskeyKempBasic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4LZ-WQE9]. Justice White dismissed the significance of the Baldus study, in part,
because “it does not appear to me that there is a serious argument that the Georgia system discriminates
against black defendants,” id. at 1, and “[t]his leaves the question whether the Georgia system would be
stricken down in toto because in some percentage of the cases, the race of the victim is determinative. I
doubt that it should.” Id. at 4; see also LAZARUS, supra note 20, at 202. See generally David C. Baldus
& George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on
the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1444, 1450–53 (2004) (suggesting
that race-of-victim discrimination presents a distinct and subtler moral question than does race-ofdefendant discrimination).
174
The State of Georgia, for example, compiled a comprehensive code of its accumulated state
slavery laws in 1860. Professor Don Fehrenbacher summarized its criminal disparities in sentencing:
Part Four, the penal code, included a separate code for slaves and free Negroes. One article of this
unit listed the crimes for which, when committed by blacks, capital punishment was mandatory or
discretionary. For instance, conviction of raping a white woman, which meant a prison sentence
of two to twenty years for a white offender, carried a mandatory death penalty for Negro
offenders. Even attempted rape of a white woman by a black man could be punished with death,
at the discretion of the court. On the other hand, rape of a slave or free Negro by a white man was
punishable “by fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.”
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
31 (1978). See generally FRANKLIN, supra note 6, 186–89 (describing pre-Civil War Black Codes).
175
60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857) (confessing that, during the first 250 years of our colonial and national
experience, black persons, slave or free, were “regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether
unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect”). See generally LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF
SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790–1860, at 93–97 (1961) (describing the multiple
challenges faced by free Blacks in Northern criminal courts, including a rule in four Midwestern states
and California that forbade Blacks to testify in any case in which a white person was a party, which was
applied in California, even if the black citizen was the complaining witness in a criminal case against a
white defendant).
176
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 244–
47, 256–59 (1988) (observing that Civil Rights Act supporters in the 39th Congress, “rejected the entire
idea of laws differentiating between black and white in access to the courts and penalties for crimes.
The shadow of the Black Codes hung over these debates, and [Congressman Lyman] Trumbull began
his discussion of the Civil Rights Bill with a reference to recent laws of Mississippi and South Carolina,
declaring his intention ‘to destroy all these discriminations’”); see also G ROSS & MAURO, supra note
101, at 119–120.
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itself. Gunnar Myrdal’s magisterial study, An American Dilemma, reported
in 1944 that interracial crimes, especially those involving a white victim,
continued to arouse especially punitive criminal responses across the South
throughout the 1920s and 1930s.177 Two early social-scientific studies in
North Carolina in the 1940s tracked precisely these patterns,178 the same
basic defendant/victim patterns that Marvin Wolfgang, and later David
Baldus, were to report decades later.179 Yet several of the Justices were
hard-pressed during the McCleskey oral argument to understand why this
seeming racial fortuity should lead to relief for someone whose victim
happened to be white; they missed the key point that, had McCleskey’s
victim been black, as Baldus’s data showed, a life sentence would have
been more likely than not, even given the troubling facts of McCleskey’s
crime.180
(6) Related to this last point, I only later realized, was the extent of the
challenge involved in trying to arouse the Court’s sense of injustice over
racial disparities in the criminal context. Many people are troubled by a
narrative of a nonwhite person who, because of his race, has been denied a
job, a place in a school, a home they could afford, or an opportunity to vote
which they deserved, or had earned. Yet the persuasive burden is
significantly greater when one who has willfully violated laws or social
norms seeks to use constitutional objections to avoid society’s lawfully
prescribed sanction. That most other killers of police officers in Fulton
County had received life sentences did little, in the eyes of the Court’s

177

2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY 551–53 (2003).
178
See Guy B. Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 93
(1941) (finding disparate death sentencing rates between 1930 and 1940 among 330 cases in five North
Carolina counties—32% when Blacks murdered Whites, 13% when Whites murdered Whites, 4% when
Blacks murdered Blacks, and a 0% when Whites murdered Blacks); Harold Garfinkel, Research Note
on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 SOC. FORCES 369, 369–70, 374 (1949) (finding comparably
disparate rates among 821 cases in ten North Carolina counties between 1930 and 1940—37%, 11%,
4%, and 0%, respectively).
179
Professor Baldus has noted that these earlier results “are strikingly comparable” to his preFurman findings in Georgia, revealing both race-of-defendant and race-of-victim disparities. BALDUS
ET AL., supra note 48, at 249–50
180
Professor Baldus testified that seventeen police officers had been murdered in Fulton County
(Atlanta), where Officer Schlatt had been murdered, during the years of his study. Six of those
seventeen had, like McCleskey’s case, involved the murder of officers during investigations of
contemporary felonies. None of the seventeen defendants eventually charged, apart from McCleskey,
received a capital sentence. Id. at 334–35. He also estimated that in what he termed the “midrange of
cases” measured by their “level of aggravation,” “where McCleskey’s case [wa]s located,” black
defendants whose victims were white received death sentences between 34% and 43% of the time,
while defendants whose victims were black received death sentences only 14%–23% of the time. Id. at
320–21. Thus, a death sentence was roughly twice as likely, or more, in white-victim cases.
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majority, to mitigate the seriousness of McCleskey’s own crime or to
undermine the acceptability of his punishment.181
(7) Lastly and most important of all, I confess to being naïve, despite
the pattern of history in this area, about the extent to which the Court might
be willing to divert its eyes from, minimize, trivialize, or even acquiesce in
proven patterns of racial discrimination that manifest themselves at a
systemic or societal level. I was chiefly worried that the Court might not
understand the study, that it might find itself lost in the details. Yet surely, I
thought, if they confronted honestly what Baldus had found, knowing the
stakes were life and death, they would be compelled to stay the State’s
hand.
I should have known better.
*

*

*

There have been many fine analyses of Justice Powell’s curious
opinion for the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp.182 I will not review them. Let
me share only my personal response. Justice Lewis Powell did what I
thought no Justice could do: purport to accept Baldus’s data, apply Eighth
Amendment and Equal Protection standards, and yet conclude that
McCleskey had failed to show a violation of his constitutional rights.
He did this in several ways: like Justice Rehnquist in Lockhart, he
accepted as proven those parts of Baldus’s findings that were congenial to
181
Justice Powell put the proposition baldly in his opinion for the Court,
[McCleskey] does not deny that he committed a murder in the course of a planned robbery, a
crime for which this Court has determined that the death penalty constitutionally may be
imposed. . . . [A]bsent a showing that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an
arbitrary and capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by
demonstrating that other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death
penalty.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 306–07 (1987).
182
See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 194–216 (2009);
GROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 159–211; KENNEDY, supra note 11, at 332–44, 388; Evan Tsen
Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against
Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145; see also James R. Acker, A Different
Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986–
1989, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 65 (1993); Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1779, 1844–47 (2012); Aziz Z. Huq, Judging Discriminatory Intent, 103 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming
2018)
(manuscript
at
48–49),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3033169 [https://perma.cc/G7JY-AYE7]; James S.
Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 82–86 (2007) (observing after a review of the majority opinion that “Justice
Powell’s analysis supports the opposite of the conclusion he reaches”); Scott E. Sundby, The Loss of
Constitutional Faith: McCleskey v. Kemp and the Dark Side of Procedure, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 5
(2012).
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his own themes and expressed radical skepticism or purposeful
misunderstanding of the rest.183
Beyond his dismissal of the facts and their significance in Georgia, his
opinion distorted the legal standards so fiercely that, as other Symposium
participants have observed, McCleskey effectively closed the book, not
only on further racial challenges in capital sentencing but, far more
broadly, on empirical racial challenges in other kinds of criminal cases.184
By holding that a defendant must show direct proof of discrimination in his
own case, Powell decreed, by circumlocution, that the federal courts should
no longer entertain statistical cases demonstrating even strong patterns of
discrimination, but only cases involving smoking gun confessions or
individualized evidence of racial misconduct or malice. “Put down your
data sets,” Justice Powell effectively instructed LDF, David Baldus, and all
future claimants, and “step against the wall.”185

183
Although Justice Powell declared that the Court will “assume the study is valid statistically
without reviewing the factual findings of the District Court,” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7, he later
spoke dismissively of Baldus’s statistics as “show[ing] only a likelihood that a particular factor entered
into some decisions,” id. at 308, adding later, that “[a]t most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy
that appears to correlate with race,” quickly assuring the reader that “[a]pparent disparities in sentencing
are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system,” id. at 312, and “a far cry from the major systemic
defects identified in Furman.” Id. at 313 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)).
In a notable incongruity, even while dismissing the study’s overwhelming evidence of widespread
racial disparities, Justice Powell was pleased to lift up the study’s non-racial conclusions, noting with
evident satisfaction that
[t]he Baldus study in fact confirms that the Georgia system results in a reasonable level of
proportionality among the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. . . . [T]he system sorts
out cases where the sentence of death is highly likely and highly unlikely, leaving a midrange of
cases where the imposition of the death penalty in any particular case is less predictable.
Id. at 313 n.36.
184
See KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 163 (observing that “[t]he standard the Court created in the
McCleskey decision not only preserved the death penalty . . . [but] also made it very difficult for capital
defendants to bring race-based constitutional claims in the future”); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE
COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 119–20 (2011) (identifying McCleskey as one of three
modern Supreme Court decisions that make claims of discriminatory policing and prosecution almost
impossible to succeed, since the demand that statistics prove some individual prosecutor, judge, or jury
acted with discriminatory intent is virtually impossible, allowing “[t]he system as a whole [to]
discriminate massively [since] . . . no single decision-maker is responsible for more than a small
fraction of the discrimination, [and thus] the law holds no one accountable for it”).
185
Professor Amsterdam has identified “the error that lies at the heart of” McCleskey as the Court’s
“supposi[tion] that conscious racial bigotry on the part of public officials is the sole significant form of
government-supported racial inequality in this country today”:
That error is both the source and the teaching of McCleskey. McCleskey assumes and declares that
we need to worry about a denial of the Equal Protection of the Laws only in the short-lived
situation where some individual decisionmaker, temporarily invested with the powers of
government, is prompted by overt racial prejudice to act discriminatorily, and that we need not be
concerned about any denial of Equal Protection in those long-continuing, culturally impacted
situations where hundreds upon hundreds of publicly empowered actors—police, prosecutors,
jurors, and judges—with no need for collusion and usually with no awareness of their own racial
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As to the Court’s Eighth Amendment concern for the “risk” of
arbitrariness demonstrated by statistical patterns of discrimination, the
Court made clear that no risk, no matter how high, would violate the
Constitution unless it went beyond a risk to become a virtual certainty.186
No longer a realm in which “death is different,” requiring higher standards
than in other cases, the Eighth Amendment rule in death sentences
shriveled into Justice Powell’s straitened Fourteenth Amendment demand
for proof of racial intention or purpose, by an individual actor in the
defendant’s own case.
Justice Powell professed that his opinion was dictated by the need to
allow states to design their own criminal justice procedures and, especially,
to allow discretion in capital sentencing.187 Yet as Justice John Paul Stevens
and many subsequent analysts have observed, there were a number of
plausible alternatives that might have struck down Georgia’s post-Furman
sentencing system while allowing a revised, more strictly tailored capital
system to go forward.188
One unsparing reading of Justice Powell’s contorted decision is that
he and the Court majority, in truth, silently concurred in views expressed in
private by their newest colleague, Justice Antonin Scalia, in an unpublished
memorandum circulated to the Court on January 6, 1987 after Scalia had

biases, march in lockstep to produce a pattern of color-coded results that reflect the powerful
prejudices of an entire population.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After McCleskey,
39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 55–56 (2007).
186
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 299–313. In one telling phrase, Justice Powell wrote that “[w]here the
discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is
unexplained is invidious.” Id. at 313. Yet the racial disparities reported by Baldus and his colleagues,
far from “unexplained,” remain among the most thoroughly “explained,” tested, examined and
reexamined findings ever presented to any American court in a criminal proceeding.
187
Justice Powell concluded his discussion of the statistical evidence with a stunning non sequitur:
since Georgia had put into place procedures to prevent discrimination (and since Georgia also valued
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the use of jury trials) the significant racial disparities
reported by the Baldus study made no constitutional difference:
In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of
jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal
defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk
of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process.
Id. Or, as Gross and Mauro titled their concluding chapter: “It’s Not Broken Because It Can’t Be
Fixed.” G ROSS & MAURO, supra note 101, at 212.
188
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 366–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Baldus’s study, which showed
that “[i]f Georgia were to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants” to embrace only those
“extremely serious crimes for which prosecutors consistently seek, and juries consistently impose, the
death penalty without regard to the race of the victim or the race of the offender,” the “danger of
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty would be significantly decreased, if not
eradicated”).
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read an early draft of Powell’s opinion.189 Let me quote the short memo, in
its entirety:
I plan to join Lewis’s opinion in this case, with two reservations. I disagree
with the argument that the inferences that can be drawn from the Baldus study
are weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is unique, or by the large
number of variables at issue. And I do not share the view, implicit in the
opinion, that an effect of racial factors upon sentencing, if it could only be
shown by sufficiently strong statistical evidence, would require reversal. Since
it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and
antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial
decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and
ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is more proof. I expect to
write separately to make these points, but not until I see the dissent.
Sincerely, Nino.190

Justice Scalia’s memorandum appears to reveal both that he
understood the explanatory power of multiple regression analysis and that
he accepted Baldus’s principal findings. Yet racial discrimination, in his
view, while “real,” was “acknowledged in the [prior] decisions of [the
Court], and ineradicable.” Justice Scalia evidently decided never to publish
these thoughts, yet Powell’s otherwise irrational and self-contradictory
opinion, behind its verbal screens, can, in my view, best be understood not
so much as a refusal to acquiesce in another LDF empirical assault, or as a
vindication of federalism, or as an impatience with habeas corpus review,
or as a misunderstanding of the functioning of race-of-victim
discrimination, or even as an indifference to an “unfairness” claim asserted
by a justly tried and convicted defendant—all the adverse factors facing
Warren McCleskey that I underestimated in 1986.
Instead, McCleskey seems to me best understood as an act of Grand
Racial Avoidance: a turning away from the reality of widespread racial
discrimination in Georgia’s capital sentencing system and an acquiescence
to Scalia’s cynical perspective. From this perspective, systemic racial bias
is, candidly, not confined to the past. It remains real and present in the postFurman capital universe. We the Court have acquiesced in it before, and
189
This unpublished memorandum, originally reported by Professor Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of
the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies from the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s
McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035 (1994), is now available online in Washington &
Lee’s collected archives of Justice Powell. See Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice,
Supreme Court of the U.S., to the Conference (Jan. 6, 1987) [hereinafter Scalia Memorandum] (located
in Justice Powell’s McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with the Washington & Lee University School
of Law Library at 147), http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/McCleskeyKempBasic.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4LZ-WQE9].
190
Scalia Memorandum, supra note 189.
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we will do so now. And if offered similar evidence in the future, we will do
so again.191
*

*

*

What is the value of any lawsuit, or the fifteen-year campaign behind
it, that ultimately makes such very bad law? What lessons can law students,
or seasoned social science researchers, learn from this story, especially
those who may passionately want to make a positive difference in this
nation’s future? Allow me three short observations to close this great
conference.
First, as Symposium participant Reva Siegel has observed, campaigns
to change law, to establish justice, often must be waged well beyond the
law courts.192 Even when advocates elect to bring controversial social
justice claims forward in courtrooms, they must assess not only the
immediate likelihood of litigation success, but the social attention their
courtroom efforts may (though by no means always will) attract to the
important issues they present. A well-constructed litigation campaign has
the potential to shape public understanding, even though it fails in a purely
legal setting, if it is carried out with the greatest candor, rigor, and
transparency. In his eloquent 2011 tribute to David Baldus, Professor
Samuel Gross made just this point about David Baldus’s work:
The main reason that race [remains] a powerful issue in debates about the
death penalty is that everyone who cares knows that race plays a major role in
determining who gets sentenced to death. And the single most important
reason that “everybody knows” this is what happened in McCleskey. Even on
the Supreme Court that sent Warren McCleskey to his death, even among the
Justices who most strongly support the death penalty, nobody has tried to deny
that racial “sympathies and antipathies” decide who lives and who dies. No

191

Long-time death penalty litigator Stephen Bright has vividly described this pattern:
Instead of acknowledging the risk of racial discrimination and attempting to identify and eliminate
it, both federal and state courts frequently dodge the inquiry. They deny the existence of racial
discrimination that is apparent to everyone; employ legal fictions that have no relation to the
reality of race relations in America today; set legal standards or burdens of proof that are
impossible to meet; or provide wholly inadequate remedies for discrimination that is undeniable.
All this may be done while the courts are issuing sweeping pronouncements decrying the evil of
racial discrimination and proclaiming their “unceasing efforts” to cure it.
Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in
Infliction of the Death Penalty, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE 211, 214 (Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006).
192
Siegel, supra note 4, at 1289–91.
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Justice said otherwise in McCleskey and none have denied it since. That may
be the enduring legacy of McCleskey.”193

A second and related point: sometimes the weight even of powerful
arguments and a completely thorough demonstration of their truth will not
suffice, alone, to change deeply embedded patterns of belief, of
understanding, and of priorities. “The race issue” did not persuade Justice
Powell or his McCleskey majority to strike the Georgia statutes. Yet once
Northwestern’s outstanding Center on Wrongful Convictions began in
1999 its tireless work to document cases in which states had convicted and
sentenced those who were actually innocent,194 a raft of former death
penalty supporters and previously confident public officials fell into
stunned silence, speechless before evidence that the innocent have been
convicted, death sentenced, and perhaps, executed. I salute this
exceptionally powerful work carried out by Northwestern and others who
have commenced this search to rescue the truly innocent.195 It has become,
along with racial discrimination, a second heavy “weight” that must be
borne by all who would attempt to justify America’s continued use of the
death penalty.196
Finally, it is notable, as others have mentioned, how some truths gain
their power not on first encounter, but only over time. At least six
Justices—including the very three, Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, whose
joint opinions were the centerpiece of the Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek decision—
have since, in one fashion or another, renounced capital punishment
altogether.197 Justice Powell’s change of mind and heart is well known. In
193

Gross, supra note 112, at 1922–23.
See Center on Wrongful Convictions, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions [https://perma.cc/W8YY-9YWG].
195
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org [https://perma.cc/94TK-8UWA]. The
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty reports that as of October 2015, 156 individuals had
been exonerated, found innocent, and released from the nation’s death rows. Exonerations of Innocent
Men and Women, NAT’L COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY (Oct. 2015),
http://www.ncadp.org/pages/innocence [http://www.ncadp.org/pages/innocence]. See generally Samuel
R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death,
111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230 (2014).
196
Professor Kirchmeier observes:
[A]fter McCleskey’s case clarified that the courts would not strike down capital punishment and
would not eliminate the risk of racial disparities, efforts to educate the public on problems with
the death penalty began to pay off. Support for the death penalty continued to be strong, but the
support fell below the level of the 1980s and 1990s. . . . Out of the moratorium movement, and
out of education about the death penalty, and out of discoveries of innocent people on death row,
significantly more people now oppose the death penalty than they did prior to the post-McCleskey
moratorium movement.
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 293.
197
The Justices who have foresworn the death penalty include Brennan and Marshall, who
renounced the punishment absolutely in Furman, as well as Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice
194
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1990, less than a year after he retired from the Court and lobbied Congress
to curtail prisoners’ access to habeas corpus procedures, Justice Powell told
his biographer that the one vote he regretted in his sixteen-year career of
Supreme Court service was the one he cast in McCleskey v. Kemp. Asked if
he meant that he had come to accept the statistical case, he responded: “No,
I would vote the other way in any capital case.”198
Justice Harry Blackmun, who upheld William Maxwell’s death
sentence as an Eighth Circuit judge, wrote a powerful dissent in the
McCleskey case, and later declared in 1994, in a routine capital certiorari
denial in Callins v. Collins,199 that “[f]rom this day forward, I no longer
shall tinker with the machinery of death,”200 explaining that he had come to
see and regret the manifold infirmities of capital punishment in daily
operation. He thus embraced the tradition of Justices Brennan and

Stevens speculated that Justice Stewart, “had he remained on the Court, surely would have voted with
the four dissenters” in McCleskey. John Paul Stevens, On the Death Sentence, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Dec. 23, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/12/23/death-sentence [https://perma.cc/R4K8KRNB]. Justice Stephen Breyer has recently posed the question of the continued constitutionality of the
death penalty in a dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg has also told law students that she would be in
favor of returning to the Court’s position in Furman, and Justice O’Connor has publicly expressed that
she harbors “serious questions” about whether the death penalty has been fairly administered.
O’Connor Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A9; see also Gross, supra note 112, at
1918–20 (citing to interviews and opinions from Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens questioning
the constitutionality of the death penalty). See generally KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 228–32
(discussing Justices Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor’s beliefs regarding the administration of the
death penalty).
198
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451 (1994). Justice
Powell’s statement is curious. If his regret reflected a developing conclusion that the death penalty
cannot be fairly administered, it is odd to center that regret in McCleskey, rather than in Furman or
especially his joint opinions in Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek, where his participation as one of the triumvirate of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens solidified the constitutionality of the entire modern death penalty regime.
It is possible that Justice Powell’s regret about his role in McCleskey reflects his discomfort as the
author of an opinion repeatedly described as a modern Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, or
Korematsu v. United States. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 185, at 47 (observing that “McCleskey is
the Dred Scott decision of our time. . . . It is a decision for which our children’s children will reproach
our generation and abhor the legal legacy we leave them”); John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Unholy Parallels Between McCleskey v. Kemp and Plessy v. Ferguson: Why McCleskey (Still)
Matters, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 63 (2012) (discussing the parallels between McCleskey and Plessy
and stating that “McCleskey, like Plessy, was ‘wrong the day it was decided’”); Bright, supra note 191,
at 236 (viewing McCleskey as “more consistent with the Court’s decisions in . . . Dred Scott v.
Sandford[] and Plessy v. Ferguson than its more recent decisions recognizing racial discrimination in
other areas of life”); Bryan Stevenson, Keynote Address by Mr. Bryan Stevenson, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
1699, 1707 (2004) (comparing McCleskey to Plessy and Korematsu); Sundby, supra note 182, at 5
(grouping McCleskey with Dred Scott, Korematsu, and Plessy).
199
510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
200
Id. at 1145.
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Marshall, both of whom had, since Furman, voted against death in every
capital case that came before them.201
Northwestern’s gift to the Supreme Court, Class of ‘47 graduate John
Paul Stevens—who wrote a short, perceptive dissent in McCleskey202—also
eventually joined Justice Blackmun in renouncing capital punishment. In
2008, in Baze v. Rees,203 a case that upheld the constitutionality of
Kentucky’s protocol for lethal injection, Justice Stevens carefully examined
all of the principal penological justifications for the death penalty, one by
one, and found all to be presently diminished or insignificant.204 He
weighed four serious problems with administration of the death penalty;
third among the four was its frequently discriminatory pattern, a pattern, he
noted, that had been uncovered in McCleskey.205 Though Justice Stevens
concurred with reluctance in Baze for reasons of stare decisis,206 later, in his
retirement, in a thoughtful 2014 book, he urged a change to the text of the
Eighth Amendment to bring a clear, constitutional end to capital
punishment.207
Most recently, in a 2016 dissent to the denial of certiorari in Glossip v.
Gross,208 reminiscent of Justice Goldberg’s dissent fifty-three years earlier
in Rudolph v. Alabama,209 Justice Stephen Breyer, with whom Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg joined, wrote that he would have invited “full briefing on
[the] . . . basic question: whether the death penalty violates the
Constitution.”210 Justice Breyer mused that the current death penalty may
well be unconstitutional for at least four reasons, naming its arbitrary
application, based on race-of-victim disparities, among the four.211
There is no formal procedure for recalculating the votes of Justices
who change their minds. Yet this extraordinary accumulation of expressed
regret by Justices who have lived with the death penalty’s fitful

201
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
202
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 366 (1987) (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
203
553 U.S. 35 (2008).
204
Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring).
205
Id. at 83–86.
206
Id. at 86.
207
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE
CONSTITUTION 123 (2014) (suggesting that the Eighth Amendment be modified to read: “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and usual punishments such as the death
penalty inflicted”) (emphasis added).
208
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2754–55 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209
375 U.S. 889, 889 (1963).
210
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211
Id. at 2756.
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administration has added to the necessary burden of those who would
continue to defend the death penalty.
*

*

*

Why should social scientists, in this time of real uncertainty about the
Court’s future (indeed the country’s future), bother with presenting social
science to courts, especially on issues of system-wide racial disparities?
How can they do so, aware of the Court’s repeated failure to confront, fully
and honestly, the continued legacies of slavery and Jim Crow, the stubborn
and self-reinforcing social stratifications that make the future so
challenging for millions of people of color and for the poor and
marginalized?
The answer I give predictably comes from my own perspective as a
former death penalty lawyer. I learned long ago, working closely with
clients—all still full of humanity and all of whom faced death—that they
and we had no practical option but to struggle on with whatever tools were
at hand. Dedicated lawyers and great social scientists can wield very
important tools. I applaud the candor of Symposium participant Paul
Butler212 and others who question the wisdom and effectiveness of
participating in a legal system so historically skewed toward preserving the
structural subordination of millions of African-American individuals and
communities, and other people of color, who find their lives circumscribed
by residential and educational segregation, restricted public services, often
punitive criminal justice practices, and deliberately restricted avenues for
political participation.
In part, how to respond to such circumstances is a matter of
temperament and personal disposition. We benefit from and sorely need
prophetic voices like those of Derrick Bell213 and Paul Butler,214 or W.E.B.

212

Paul Butler, Equal Protection and White Supremacy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1457 (2018).
See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
10–14 (1992) (expressing the view that “[b]lack people will never gain full equality in this country,”
and that even “short-lived victories” will “slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that
maintain white dominance” (emphasis omitted)); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 51–74 (1987).
214
Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal Justice
Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1436–38, 1471–78 (2016) (contrasting the respective roles of “traditional
civil rights organizations” such as LDF that “focus on liberal reform” with the “broader scale
transformation,” working toward a Third Reconstruction that needs to be undertaken by the Movement
for Black Lives and other more radically transformative groups).
213
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Du Bois of an earlier era215—who speak out of a profound skepticism that
our present system will ever work to cure its own ills. Yet I join with those
who observe that we benefit as well from reformers like LDF’s
leadership—Thurgood Marshall, Jack Greenberg, Julius Chambers, Elaine
Jones, Ted Shaw, John Payton, and Sherrilyn Ifill—who work tirelessly
within the system, using what tools circumstances present, to press for
incremental change toward justice. And whatever the likelihood of
immediate change through law, we need committed social scientists in the
tradition of David Baldus, who will explore with imagination, rigor, and
transparent integrity, the multiple forces that create and maintain racial
discrimination, sharing their research findings even in an era where the cry
of “fake news” greets every unwelcome fact.
Warren McCleskey’s execution took place in a small, one-story cinder
block building in the far rear of the sprawling rural grounds of the Georgia
Diagnostic and Classification Center in Jackson, Georgia.216 It was long
215
See, e.g., W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC.
328, 328–29 (1935) (questioning the plausibility and desirability of legal efforts by the NAACP and
others to press for integrated public education, and examining the illusion that civil rights litigation can
ever lead to permanent equality for African-Americans: “I am no fool; and I know that race prejudice in
the United States today is such that most Negroes cannot receive proper education in white
institutions”).
216
McCleskey’s execution was delayed for over four years after the Supreme Court’s 1987
decision because of defense counsel’s serendipitous discovery—from an attorney friend of
McCleskey’s, Robert Stroup—of a twenty-one-page document, a statement made by the jailhouse
informant, Offie Evans, who had provided damning testimony against McCleskey at his trial.
KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 35. The document clearly fell within the category of documents
repeatedly requested from the State, without any success, by McCleskey’s trial and appellate counsel—
before trial, during trial, on appeal, and in state habeas corpus proceedings—and it strongly confirmed
defense counsel’s earlier suspicions of a secret relationship between the key witness Evans and the
State.
Once discovered in late 1987, the document led to an Atlanta jailor, Ulysses Worthy, who testified
before Judge Owen Forrester, during a successive federal habeas hearing, that someone, likely the chief
police investigator on the McCleskey case, Atlanta Detective Sidney Dorsey, had secretly instructed
jailor Worthy to move Evans, who had served as a prior informant for Dorsey in other cases, to the jail
cell next to McCleskey, and had instructed the informant Evans to “gather[] incriminating information”
on McCleskey. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 475 (1991).
Faced with this unrebutted evidence that the State had violated McCleskey’s Sixth Amendment
rights against surreptitious state questioning under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) and
McCleskey’s right to receipt of this relevant witness statement from the State, and then used this
informant against McCleskey at trial, Judge Forrester, for the second time, reversed McCleskey’s
capital conviction and directed a new trial. McCleskey v. Kemp, No. C87-1517A (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23,
1987), at 63–97.
The Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed the District Court decision, McCleskey, 890 F.2d 342 (11th
Cir. 1989), and the Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. McCleskey,
499 U.S. 467. Both appellate courts faulted not the State, but defense counsel, for initially raising such a
claim (albeit without benefit of the evidence deliberately withheld by the State) and thereafter
“abus[ing] . . . the writ” of habeas corpus by abandoning the claim, during its earlier federal habeas
appeals, after they had been unable to obtain evidence in support thereof. Id. at 497–503. Justice
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after midnight on a rain-swept night. Three rows of witnesses sat in plastic
chairs on the far side of the execution chamber into which Warren was led.
After being strapped into Georgia’s electric chair, thick wires attached to
his temples and legs, he was permitted some final words before his death.
Self-composed and dignified despite the barbaric setting, Warren began to
speak into a microphone, thanking those who had supported him,
expressing his regret to the family of Atlanta police officer Frank Schlatt,
and confessing the impact of his religious conversion and faith.217
Suddenly, without any explanation, Warren’s microphone went silent,
he was led out of the execution chamber, and all came to a halt. We later
learned that a temporary stay of execution had been entered by a federal
court. Some thirty-four minutes later, prison authorities determined that the
stay had been lifted, and Warren was re-strapped into the electric chair.
Though he began again to share his final thoughts, the microphone was not
turned back on.218 Those of us on the far side of the thick glass partition
realized we would hear nothing of Warren’s last words in the moments
Marshall, in a bitter dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, showed how Justice Kennedy’s
opinion rested upon a novel reinterpretation that radically tightened the “abuse of the writ” standard,
thereby jettisoning several decades of controlling federal law on the issue, to McCleskey’s fatal
disadvantage. Id. at 506–23 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall added that Justice Kennedy’s opinion
had then applied its new standard in a way Marshall described as “hollow[]” and “dangerous[]”. Id. at
526.
The majority’s invocation of “the orderly administration of justice” rings hollow when the
majority itself tosses aside established precedents without explanation, disregards the will of
Congress, fashions rules that defy the reasonable expectations of the persons who must conform
their conduct to the law’s dictates, and applies those rules in a way that rewards state misconduct
and deceit. Whatever “abuse of the writ” today’s decision is designed to avert pales in comparison
with the majority’s own abuse of the norms that inform the proper judicial function.
Id. at 529 (citation omitted).
Detective Dorsey, who arranged the secret interrogation of McCleskey, was later elected Sheriff of
DeKalb County in metropolitan Atlanta. Sheriff Dorsey lost reelection after one term and immediately
directed several of his senior officers to assassinate his successful opponent, apparently to cover up
widespread corruption and abuse by his office. Ironically, for his role in this brazen murder, Detective
Dorsey was himself sentenced to life imprisonment. See Ex-Sheriff Gets Life in Death of Successor,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/16/us/ex-sheriff-gets-life-in-death-ofsuccessor.html [https://perma.cc/DE4X-9M3F]; see also KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 305–06
(describing the circumstances surrounding Dorsey’s conviction for ordering the murder of the candidate
who defeated him in the sheriff’s election).
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KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 189. McCleskey’s statement included the following:
First of all I would like to say to the Schlatt family that I am deeply sorry and repentant for the
suffering, hurt and pain that you have endured over the years. I wish there was something I could
do or say that would give comfort to your lives and bring peace to it. I pray that you would find in
your heart to forgive me for the participation in the crime that caused the loss of your loved
one. . . . I am deeply sorry for the lives that have been altered the way they have because of my
ignorance and stupidity. . . . This is not the end, but the beginning I hoped for—to be in the
presence of my Lord.
Id.
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Applebome, supra note 3.
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before his death, and Warren was apparently unaware of the silence beyond
the death chamber.219
Forgive me if I close with a metaphor. Those who have participated in
this Symposium as speakers, researchers, scholars, teachers, and students,
possess a special capacity: to turn that microphone on again, to speak out
on racial injustices that still plague the criminal justice system. The State of
Georgia exercised its own brute power to put Warren McCleskey to death
in the post-midnight September darkness. Yet empirical evidence and
constitutional arguments have their own uncanny counter-power to survive,
regather strength, and shine light into darkness, defying adverse judicial
decisions and our present, woeful consequences.
Whether those labors yield prophecies that go unheeded, or reforms
one day accomplished, I salute those who continue their ongoing empirical
research, or statutory and constitutional analyses—in sum, who continue to
set their shoulders against the burden of America’s 400-year legacy of
racial injustice and subordination.
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KIRCHMEIER, supra note 1, at 189.

